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Within South Africa, there is an issue of non-compliance with government policy among 
small-scale fishing communities. This has a detrimental impact on the sustainable 
governance of fisheries. It is important to understand underlying factors that influence 
individuals' decisions whether or not to comply with national law. 
This paper is a case study of the Karbonkelberg Marine Protected Area in which fishers 
from the Hangberg community illegally harvest West Coast Rock Lobster. Through a 
legal pluralism perspective, this research seeks to determine whether the high level of 
non-compliance is a result of the existence of more than one legal order. The research 
reveals there is an organised informal fishery amongst fishers from Hangberg with 
informal rules and practices. Therefore, the Karbonkelberg demonstrates a dual presence 
of normative practices amongst illegal fishers from the Hangberg community, within a 
formal legal order. 
This study suggests that the issue of non-compliance is related to the perceived 
legitimacy of the formal legal order. This is better understood when environmental, social 
and economic factors are taken into consideration. The issue can be effectively addressed 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Black is the former generic term in South Africa for those ethnic groups identified by 
previous apartheid policies as "Indian", "African" or "Coloured". 
Coloured is a term coined during the former apartheid regime referring to a diverse 
group of 'mixed race' people descended from slaves, the indigenous Khoisan 
peoples, black people, European settlers and others. 
Common-Pool Resource or CPR is a class of resources for which exclusion is 
difficult and joint use involves subtractability. 
Legal order is "where coercive means, of a physical or psychological kind, are available; 
... in other words wherever we find a consociation specifically dedicated to the 
purpose of 'legal coercion' (Weber, 1954)." 
Legal pluralism is the presence in a social field of more than one legal order or the 
different legal mechanisms applicable to identical situations. 
Local law refers to the mixture of customary (or folk) law, new forms of self-regulation, 
elements of old and new state law, donor laws and social norms that are expressed 
and used at a local level. 
The prisoner's dilemma game is a noncooperative game in which all players 
possess complete information 1 ••• communication among players is 
forbidden or impossible or simply irrelevant as long as it is not explicitly 
modelled as part of the game 
Property rights define the uses that are legitimately viewed as being exclusive and 
designate who enjoy these exclusive rights. Thus property rights grant 
entitlements regarding resource use and prescribe rules under which these 
entitlements are exercised. 
Rock lobster trap means any trap, pot or other implement of whatever constructor, 
intended or used for the fishing or holding of rock lobster, but does not include a 
rock lobster ring-net. 
Small-scale fisher refers to commercial fishers who harvest with low technology and 
capital input and is labour intensive. 
State law refers to law enacted by the authoritative governing power of a country or 
nation. 
I When all players have 'complete information' it implies they know the payoffs of each outcome and 











Subsistence fisher, according to the South African Subsistence Fisheries Task Group 
(SFTG), "are poor people who harvest marine resources as a source of food or to 
sell them to meet the basic needs of food security; they operate on or near the 
shore or in estuaries, live in close proximity to the resource, consume or sell the 
resources locally, use low-technology gear (often as part of a long-standing 
community-based or cultural practice), and the kinds of resources they harvest 
generate only sufficient returns to meet the basic needs of food security" (Hauck 
and Sowman, 2003:345). 
West Coast Rock Lobster in this thesis refers to the species Jaslis lalandii, also known 












1.1 Common Pool Resource Management and Legal Pluralism 
Over the last thirty years, the sustainable governance of Common-Pool Resources or 
CPRs in environmental management has been, and continues to be, a highly debated 
issue amongst policy-makers, scholars and users alike. A memorable al1icle by Hardin 
(1968) on CPRs described what he referred to as the 'Tragedy of the Commons'. Hardin 
argued that the individual decisions of a 'rational' user of an open access CPR will 
inevitably culminate to a tragic overuse and destruction of the commons (Hardin, 1968). 
Hardin's proposed solution for the sustainable governance of CPRs was either state or 
private property ownership of the commons. Hardin's model was supported by other 
theories such as 'Rational Choice Theory' and 'Prisoner's Dilemma Game'. These three 
theories conceptualised that users of an open access CPR would exploit the resource until 
its irreversible degradation. Hence the nationalisation and/or privatisation of CPRs such 
as forests, fisheries and water sources was institutionalised in policy making and 
management systems in the form of property rights. 
Four major broad types of formal property rights systems used to regulate CPRs have 
evolved. Feeny et al. (1990) categorise them as (I) open access, (2) group property, (3) 
individual property, and (4) government property. Open access refers to the absence of 
property regime. Group, individual or government property regimes grant rights or 
privileges to others to use or exploit the resources with guidelines and restrictions 
imposed by the group, individual or government respectively. Under a government 
property regime, access to marine resources is sometimes referred to as sea tenures 
(Cordell, 1989: 1 cited by Bavinck, 2005 :811), and the most common form of tenure right 
is a quota. A quota defines the weight amount of a particular species that can be 











Ostrom et al. (1999) believe that the effective and sustainable governance of CPRs is not 
dependant on a single type of property regime, but rather on the ability to restrict access 
and create incentives for users to not overexploit the resource. In addition Hardin's 
assumption of the 'Tragedy of the Commons' in open access CPRs has been challenged 
over the last thirty years. Research has revealed evidence that for hundreds of years, 
people have self-organised and devised informal traditional and/or customary institutions 
for governing CPRs without the state imposing regulations on the resource use (Ostrom, 
1990; McCay and Acheson, 1987). Case studies have also revealed the existence of 
informal customs, rules and institutions which either restrict or control access to the sea 
or to the resource itself. Examples include the trawling fishery in the New York Bight 
region (Berkes et aI., 1989), the Maine lobster fishery in the United States (Acheson, 
1975), and in the Coromandel Coast of India (Bavinck, 2005).2 These customs and rules 
are not legal in terms of being established and enforced by the state, but can be regarded 
as a 'legal order'. Weber defines a legal order as "wherever we find a consociation 
specifically dedicated to the purpose of 'legal coercion'" (Weber, 1954: 17, cited by 
Griffiths, 1986:40). Therefore, although states establish sea tenure regimes to govern 
their fisheries, there is evidence of "different legal mechanisms applicable to identical 
situations" (Vanderlinden, 1972:20 cited by Bavinck, 2005:811), otherwise referred to as 
legal pluralism (Griffiths, 1986). 
1.2 Significance of legal pluralism in South African fisheries 
The influence of informal rules on the effective governance of fisheries has only recently 
entered the debate on governing CPRs. Both Bavinck (2005) and Acheson and Gardner 
(2004) evaluate the potential for conflict between the formal laws and sea tenure systems, 
and informal rules in the Coromandel Coast of India and the Maine lobster fishery of the 
United States respectively. There is, however, little known about the presence or absence 
of informal rules in small-scale fishing communities in South Africa. This gap in the 
literature requires further study for two reasons. The first reason relates to the history of 
apartheid in South Africa. Although small-scale fishing communities faced political and 











economic discrimination during apartheid, they found ways to survive and sustain their 
livelihoods. The current government needs to understand how communities organized 
themselves, whether they devised informal systems and rules to govern their fishing 
patterns and behaviour during the apartheid regime, and to identify if these informal rules 
play a significant role in fishing communities today. Secondly, by understanding the 
informal rules and their significance in the small scale fishing communities, the 
underlying cause of contlict between fisheries management and small-scale fishers may 
be better understood. This contlict often manifests itself as non-compliance, which has 
been a continuous challenge in South Africa since the new democratic era, after the 
abolishment ofthe apartheid regime. 
1.3 Background and purpose of research 
In the quest to understand why there is non-compliance, a fishery compliance research 
project was initiated in South Africa. This research is conducted as part of a Norwegian-
South African (NORSA) partnership on fisheries research. The aim of the project is to 
develop an analytical compliance framework for understanding and addressing non-
compliance in small-scale fisheries in South Africa. Primary research in four case studies 
in South Africa is being conducted. These include the following: 
I. Abalone Case Study in the South Western Cape; 
II. Swartkops Bait Fishery in the Eastern Cape; 
1\1. Institutional arrangement existing between the Ezemvelo KwaZulu Natal Wildlife 
Department and local communities; and 
IV. Rock Lobster fishery in the Table Mountain National Park Marine Protected Area. 
There are a number of key factors to be considered in selecting case study sites in the 
NORSA fisheries compliance project, and these have included the following: 
I. Value of resource (high, medium, low) 
II. Management approach (co-management, delegation, law enforcement etc.) 
1\1. Institutional structure 











v. Success/Failure of compliance strategies 
VI. Logistics (if background info is available or previous relationships). 
Preliminary factors identified in the project for understanding compliance include 
institutional, historical, political, social, economic and ecological opportunities and 
constraints. Informal rules are also one of the preliminary factors. 
This thesis research is part of the NORSA fisheries compliance project and focuses on the 
Rock Lobster fishery in the Table Mountain National Park Marine Protected Area 
(TMNP MPA). This thesis seeks to understand non-compliance in the Karbonkelberg no-
take zone within the TMNP MPA through a legal pluralism perspective. It draws on 
literature from common-pool resource management and legal pluralism. The aim of this 
research is to determine if there is legal plurality in the Karbonkelberg and to investigate 
the presence of informal rules in a small-scale commercial fishing community called 
Hangberg in Hout Bay, Western Cape. Fishers from the Hangberg community have been 
engaging in illegal fishing of West Coast Rock Lobster (WCRL) in the Karbonkelberg 
which has led to an increased concern over non-compliant behaviour by SA National 
Parks (SAN Parks) law enforcement officials. 
The research also aims to answer whether these informal rules playa significant role in 
the methods, patterns and behaviour of the fishers in Hout Bay and their compliance or 
non-compliance to state fishing regulations. This research answers the following 
questions: 
I. Whether or not there is legal plurality in the Karbonkelberg; 
2. What the informal rules are amongst the small-scale poaching groups In 
Hangberg; 
3. What the significance of these informal rules are in the behaviour, the fishing 
patterns of fishers and their decisions; and 
4. Whether the informal rules influence the fishers' compliance to the state law 











1.4 Structure of thesis 
This thesis has six chapters. Chapter 2 gives the conceptual context of the research in 
terms of two bodies of literature: common pool resource management and legal 
pluralism. Chapter 3 details the methodology used to answer the research questions, 
before going into the background to the case study in Chapter 4. Informal rules identified 
in the informal fishery, within the system of formal national laws, are presented In 












2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The conceptual context of this research is based on two broad bodies of literature. This 
research is focused on fishing activities in the Karbonkelberg MPA. Fishing is regarded 
as a common-pool resource; therefore literature on common-pool resource governance 
was reviewed. The nationalisation and privatisation of common-pool resources (ePRs), 
drawn from the conventional wisdom that open access would lead to the detrimental 
degradation of ePRs, has been adopted by policy makers. 3 However, this conventional 
wisdom has been challenged. Empirical evidence has shown that 'open access' ePRs are 
not actually open to all, as users and local communities have developed informal 
community rules and norms which they use to manage the resource.4 In the 
Karbonkelberg, the high level of non-compliance is in part due to the existence of an 
informal fishery with its informal rules. To understand the possible implications that the 
presence of informal rules may have on the governance of fisheries, a second body of 
literature on legal pluralism was also reviewed. Due to the fact that this research centres 
on a small scale fishery, examples of informal rules in small-scale fishing communities 
were reviewed, and their legitimacy and potential for conflict is also discussed.s 
2.1 Common Pool Resources 
ePRs refer to natural and human resource systems, regardless of the property rights 
involved. ePRs have two main characteristics: 
1. Exclusion of beneficiaries through physical and institutional means is especially 
costly (Feeny et ai, 1990:3 and Ostrom et aI., 1999:278) because of the physical 
3 For example, the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998 nationalises all marine living resources in South 
Africa. 
4 Discussed further in section 2.2.2 
5 Small-scale fishers are defined by Bavinck (2005:806) as "fishers who use beach-landing craft and 
passive fishing gear and have a limited range of operation. Generally their occupation is less capital-











nature of the resource. For example, it is difficult to restrict access to fisheries, 
wildlife, forests, ground water, the high seas, the atmosphere, and so on. 
II. The exploitation by one user reduces resource availability for other. Berkes et 
al. (1989:91) and Feeny et al. (1990:3) refer to this as subtractability. 
Hence the definition of ePRs adopted for the purposes of this research is that given by 
Berkes et al. (1989:91), who defines a CPR as "a class of resources for which exclusion is 
difficult and joint use involves subtractability." 
The terms 'common-pool resource' and 'common property regime', although sometimes 
used interchangeably, are not the same thing. A common pool resource describes the 
characteristic of the resource, while common property regime describes a type of 
property rights regimes used to govern a resource (Ostrom et aI., 1999: 278). For the 
purpose of this dissertation, the term CPR is used in the sense of a common-pool 
resource. The next section describes the various property right regimes common in the 
field of CPR policy. 
2.1.1 Property Rights 
Property rights assign benefits from the utilisation of a resource and are characterised by 
specific exclusivity, transferability, inheritability, alienability and enforcement 
mechanisms (Hauck and Sowman, 2003: 15). 
"Property rights define the uses that are legitimately viewed as being 
exclusive and designate who enjoy these exclusive rights. Thus property 
rights grant entitlements regarding resource use and prescribe rules under 
which these entitlements are exercised." (Hauck and Sowman, 2003: 15) 
In terms of sea and marine resources, property rights are also sometimes referred to as sea 
tenures. Sea tenure is about "sea-based property rights" and the utilization of fish stocks 











The regulations and rules specific to each type of rights will differ, depending upon the 
particular regime governing the CPR. The characteristics of ePRs affect how they are 
governed. These characteristics include: the size and carrying capacity of the resource 
system; the temporal and spatial availability of the resource (whether the resources move 
or are stationary); how fast the resources regenerate, or the speed of resource 
regeneration; the storage capacity of the system; how harvesting technologies affect 
regeneration; and how easy it is to measure the resource (Ostrom et al., 1999:279). 
Four main property-rights regimes have evolved: open access, private property, 
communal property and state property (Berkes, 1989; Feeny et al., 1990:4-5 and Hauck 
and Sowman, 2003: 16). 
1. Open access, or res nullius, refers to the absence of well-defined property rights. 
The resource is unregulated, giving free and open access to all. 
2. Communal property, or res commune, refers to a situation when an identifiable 
community holds rights to the resource and is able to exclude others and regulate 
the use of the resource. The users in the community are interdependent, and the 
rights are usually of equal access and use (Feeny et al., 1990:4). Forests, inshore 
fisheries, groundwater, and irrigation systems are some examples of resources that 
can be held under common property rights. 
3. Private property, or res privatae, refers to the right of the individual or 
corporation to exclude others from using the resources, and to regulate its use. 
Private property rights are usually "exclusive and transferable" (Feeny et al., 
1990:3); for example, privately-held rangelands or forests. 
4. State/government property, or res publicae, gives the government exclusive rights 
to the resource. The government controls both access and the level of exploitation. 
This is also sometimes referred to as state governance. State property may allow 
the general public equal access and use rights; for example, national parks. The 
state, however, unlike a private owner, has "coercive powers of enforcement" 
(Feeny et al., 1990:5). For state governance to be effective, exclusivity must be 
ensured, which is dependant on the financial and human resource available for 











South Africa follows a similar typology of property regimes for the governance of their 
CPRs. In addition, there are co-management regimes that share the responsibilities and 
decision-making powers in managing a resource between government, resource users and 
other stakeholders (Berkes et ai., 1991 cited by Hauck and Sowman, 2003 :3). In South 
African fisheries, the resource is either governed under government property or co-
management regimes. 
Conversely, it is viewed that CPRs are held in a combination of several overlapping types 
of rights.6 Ostrom (2003) classifies these rights in terms of the action permitted rather 
than the owner of the resource. 
1. Rights to use or access: gIves rights to enter a defined area and enJoy non-
subtractive benefits; for example, hiking. Holders are thus authorized entrants. 
2. Rights to withdraw: gives rights to obtain resources units or products of a resource 
system; for example, allowing someone to catch fish. 
3. Rights to management: gives rights to regulate internal use patterns, to control the 
users and transform the resource by making improvements; for example, setting 
quotas in fisheries. 
4. Rights to exclusion: gives rights to determine who will have access and how that 
right may be transferred; for example, setting criteria for who can apply for a 
quota. 
5. Rights to alienation: gIves rights to sell or lease exclusion, management or 
withdrawal rights. (Ostrom, 2003: 249) 
In this classification, a CPR user is one with rights to access and withdraw, and a 
claimant is one who has access, withdrawal and management rights (Ostrom, 2003: 250). 
A proprietor of a CPR is considered to have access, withdrawal, management and 
exclusion rights, while a full owner of a CPR has all rights as a proprietor but also has the 
right to alienation (Ostrom, 2003:252). All these rights can be held by individuals or 
6 Schlager and Ostrom (1992), Benda-Beckmann and Spiertz (1997 cited by Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 











collectives (Ostrom, 2003:250). Therefore, an individual, a private corporation, a 
government or a communal group can have full ownership rights. However, common-
property regimes have participants who are only proprietors. Ostrom argues that these 
rights "better reflect the status and organization of the holder of a particular right, than 
the bundle of property rights held" (Ostrom, 2003:252). 
The difficulties in exclusivity leave CPRs as highly exploitable resources, and the nature 
of subtractability implies that overexploitation endangers their long-term biological and 
economic viability. Three models are commonly used by policy makers and decision 
makers to explain why CPRs are highly exploited to the point of being endangered; these 
include the Hardin's 'Tragedy of the Commons', Ral;onal Cho;ce Theory and the 
Pr;soner's Ddemma Game (Hauck and Sowman, 2003: 17). These models have had 
significant influence in defining the policies and regulations governing CPRs in South 
Africa. In order to fully understand the context of the policies affecting fishers in 
Hangberg, it is necessary to examine the assumptions underlying these models which 
influence the decision making process. Assessing the relevance and appropriateness of 
these models at the local level will shed light on the suitability of the formal policies and 
reasons for non-compliance amongst the Hangberg fishers. 
2.1.2 Tragedy of the Commons 
Hardin's theory of the 'Tragedy of the Commons' claims that "freedom In a commons 
brings ruin to all" (1968: 1244). The 'Tragedy of the Commons' is an early theory 
addressing the issue of the governance of CPRs. The theory paints a picture that in an 
infinitely increasing popUlation where each person inherently seeks to maximise their 
resources, yet lives in and is dependent on the earth's finite resources, the result is the 
degradation of the common resource (Hardin, 1968: 1244). 
To elaborate, the utility of a common resource has both a positive and a negative 
component. The positive component refers to the benefits of adding more effort in 











source, thus leaving less of the resource available. The 'Tragedy of the Commons' model 
hypothesizes that each 'rational' user in an open access system of a resource is driven to 
maximise their own benefits, thus they continue to harvest regardless of the effects on 
others. The more users of the resource, the more resource harvested, leading to the ruin of 
the resource (Hardin, 1968: 1244). This model posits that appealing to people's 
consciousness will not suffice as a means of preventing the destruction of the commons. 
Thus humans need the CPRs to be managed under government or private property if they 
are to be managed effectively. However, over the last thirty years, research has provided 
evidence that has contested Hardin's theory of the 'Tragedy of the Commons,7. 
What do we mean by a 'rational' user? The second model of rational choice theory helps 
to understand what Hardin refers to as a 'rational' user. 
2.1.3 Rational Choice theory 
Olson argues that "unless the number of individuals is quite small or unless there is 
coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, 
rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group 
interest" (Olson, 1965 :2). In this statement, Olson challenges the view of a rational self-
interested individual depicted in group theory. 
Group theory claims that if a group of people have a common objective or interest and if 
they would all be better off if that objective or interest is achieved, then all the 
individuals in that group, if rational and self-interested, would act to achieve that 
objective (Olson, 1965: I). Group theory presumes that "individuals with common 
interests would voluntarily act so as to try to further those interests" (Ostrom 1990:5), 
which Olson argues against and posits that if people cannot be excluded from the benefits 
of collective action, they will have no incentive to voluntarily act to further their common 
interests. This argument is based on Rational Choice Theory. 











Rational choice theorists explain outcomes and events in terms of the attitudes, 
expectations and interactions of individual actors whose actions are seen to be rational if 
they "constitute the best way of achieving some given goal" (Hindmoor, 2006:2). 
Rational choice theorists also assume that people will always act entirely out of self-
interest, that people have reasons to believe what they believe, and that they hold the best 
possible beliefs given the information they have available (Hindmoor, 2006:2). 
Therefore, rational choice theorists assume that people are rational not only because they 
have reasons to act, but also because their actions are the best possible actions they could 
have taken given their beliefs and desires (Hindmoor, 2006: 190). 
In short, rational choice theory explains that in their own self interest, people will make 
decisions that they believe are the best to achieve a given goa\. In relation to CPRs, the 
goal of a CPR user, from a rational choice perspective, will be to maximise their benefits 
from the resource. If one assumes that they know the subtractability nature of CPRs, and 
that an individual will always act in their self interest, a 'rational' CPR user will act so as 
to maximise their own benefits from the CPR by harvesting as much as they can for the 
maximum amount of profit, regardless of other users. However, if all CPR users 
maximised their returns from a CPR resource every time, the resource would become 
overexploited, rendering the resource unprofitable for other users. Thus, individual 
rationality in the long run can become less profitable for CPR users because of the 
resulting overuse and destruction of the resource. This is the same logic as in Hardin's 
'Tragedy of the Commons'. 
This theory of individual rationalism does not always imply that collective governance of 
a resource is impossible. It may be in the interest of individuals to engage in collective 
use and management of a CPR.8 Anthropologists argue that historically, natural resources 
have been sustainably governed through the collective action of individuals. Evidence of 
collective governance of natural resources revealed over the last thirty years has led to a 











debate over the validity of the rational choice and the 'Tragedy of the Commons' 
models.9 
It is argued in this study that the behaviour of the fishers in Hangberg follows the pattern 
of a 'rational' user, as depicted in the rational choice theory. Although the fishers are 
exhibiting non-compliant behaviour, they believe that their decisions and actions are the 
best alternative to the formal laws placed to maximise their benefits from the resource. 
The research seeks to determine whether the fishers participate in collective action to 
maximise their benefits. Therefore this research investigates whether the fishers harvest 
and/or manage the resource collectively, and whether there are any norms or informal 
rules amongst them. 
2.1.4 Prisoners Dilemma Game 
Hardin's 'Tragedy of the Commons' has been formalised by the Prisoner's Dilemma 
Game (PDG) (Wade, 1987; Ostrom, 1990:2; Acheson and Gardner, 2004:297) and is one 
of the analytical models used in Game Theory (Hauck and Sowman, 2003: 17).10 The 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game is described as follows: 
"a noncooperative game in which all players possess complete 
information 11 ... communication among players is forbidden or impossible 
or simply irrelevant as long as it is not explicitly modelled as part of the 
game" (Ostrom, 1990:4). 
If there is communication between players then any agreements made in this game are 
not binding and are therefore not enforced by an external actor (Ostrom, 1999). The PDG 
is described in Ostrom (1990:3-7) and Acheson and Gardner (2004:297) where each 
player has a dominant strategy which is referred to as the 'defect' strategy. The authors 
describe that the individual player is always better off choosing this strategy because it 
9 This debate is briefly summarised in section 2.1.5. 
10 Game theory is used to study problems of collective action (Knudsen, 1995 cited by Hauck and Sowman, 
2003) 
II When all players have 'complete information' it implies they know the payoffs of each outcome and 











maximises their profit or returns from the natural resource, no matter what the other 
player(s) choose. Each player also has the option of the 'cooperate' strategy in which the 
profit or returns of each player is equally shared amongst all players. The optimal 
strategy is for all players to collectively choose to cooperate (Ostrom, 1990:4). However 
there can be scenarios where one player can choose to cooperate while another player 
chooses to defect. In this case, the player who chooses to cooperate loses some of the 
benefits while the player who chose the dominant strategy (to defect) gains more. Lastly, 
all players can choose the dominant strategy, which leads to zero profits or returns for all 
of them. Ostrom (1990:4) refers to this as the 'Hardin herder game' or 'Game 1', 
illustrated in the matrix in Figure. 1 below with two players. 
Player 2 
STRATEGY cooperate defect 
cooperate 6:6 0:8 
defect 8:0 2:2 
Figure 1. Hypothetical Prisoner's Dilemma Game. 
(Acheson and Gardner, 2004:297) 
The numbers in the matrix represent the payoff each player receives that is determined by 
the costs and benefits of a number of variables (Acheson and Gardner, 2004:297). The 
first number in each cell in the matrix indicates the payoff for player I, and the second 
number the payoff for player 2. If player 2 chooses not to cooperate, player 1 loses out 
and player 2 gets 8 units of profit. Therefore player 1 would still be better of by not 
cooperating because if player 2 chooses not to cooperate, player I still gets 2 units of 
profit. Thus, regardless of the action of the other player, it is in the best interest for a 
player not to cooperate and to maximise their benefits. This however is not the optimum 
option. 
In the game, the optimal outcome is for both players to cooperate. However, given the 
assumptions of non-cooperation and lack of communication in the game, the best 
individual strategy is the defect strategy - to use or harvest as much of the resource as 











cooperation and communication between users of a CPR, "individual rational strategies 
lead to collectively irrational outcomes" (Ostrom, 1990:5). Herein lies the 'Tragedy of 
the Commons' which Hardin illustrated: each rational user will choose to maximise their 
own gain from the resource, yielding no profit for either of them. 
It is argued in this case study that the fishers in Hangberg do not live and fish in isolation 
and that there is communication amongst the fishers. This research will determine 
whether fishers in Hangberg have chosen the defect strategy to fish alone, or whether 
they have chosen to cooperate and harvest crayfish together. Therefore this research 
explores what strategy the fishers use to maximise the benefits from the resource, and 
how the fishers organise themselves. 
2.1.5 Implications and Critique of the Tragedy of the Commons 
According to both Hardin and the conventional models of CPR exploitation, the open 
access regime would inevitably lead to degradation of the resource. The conventional 
wisdom of managing the commons in the 1960s to 1980s has followed Hardin's 
argument. The degradation of common-pool resources was seen as inevitable unless 
government regulations were instituted or it was converted into private property (Berkes, 
et al. 1989:91). Hardin and others 12 perpetuated the support of government control, 
private property rights and inheritance systems to be institutionalised to govern CPRs. 13 
Consequently, policy makers have developed policy based on these assumptions. 
Although nationalisation aims to distribute the benefits of a CPR over a larger number of 
people by allowing them to apply for rights to exploit the resource, there is a danger of 
over exploitation without effective monitoring of the number of CPR users in a limited 
resource. Privatisation allows for few individuals to invest in exploiting a CPR efficiently 
to maximise benefits from the resource, but may exclude other individuals who depend 
on the CPR without access to exploit the resource. 
12 Hardin and Baden, 1977 
13 Hardin's recommendation to place CPRs under government control or in private property regimes 











Conversely, the conventional wisdom that degradation is inevitable unless common 
property is regulated by instituted government controls or converted to private property 
has been challenged. A critique of Hardin's model of CPR management, offered by 
Berkes et al. (1989:93), outlines four assumptions of the model that have been challenged 
over the last twenty years. Firstly, Hardin's model assumes that open access leads to 
overexploitation because it equates CPRs with open access. Secondly, the model assumes 
that users are incapable of self-regulation, and that there is no means by which they can 
act collectively. Thirdly, Hardin ignores culture, and assumes that resource users do not 
conform to the prescribed and enforced rules of conduct that often exist within 
communities. Fourthly, the model undermines the role of social institutional 
arrangements which exclude and regulate the use of CPRs (Berkes et aI., 1989:93 and 
Feeny et aI., 1990: 13). 
Further studies have shown that in the absence of any property rights regime, 
communities dependent on CPRs adopted "various institutional arrangements to manage 
the resources, with varying degrees of success in achieving sustainable use" (Berkes et 
aI., 1989:91). Studies have shown that CPR users are capable of acting collectively to 
devise methods to exclude and regulate users of the CPR, and conform to prescribed and 
enforced rules. 14 These studies give evidence that contradict the assumptions under 
Hardin's model, showing that not all CPRs are open access. Therefore, these findings 
imply that privatisation or nationalisation is not the only definitive solution to the CPR 
problem of potential overexploitation. Rather, the solution to CPR problems depends on 
the ability of restricting access and creating incentives for users not to overexploit the 
resource (Ostrom et aI., 1999). 
Empirical studies show that "no single type of property regime works efficiently, fairly, 
and sustainably in relation to all CPRs" (Ostrom et a1.1999: 279). Recently Dietz, Ostrom 
and Stern (2003: 1909) have pointed out that successful governance of commons is 
attainable when the following factors are in place: 
I. The use of resource can be monitored at low cost; 











2. There are no rapid changes in the resource; 
3. Changes in user populations, technology or other social and economic conditions 
are moderate; 
4. Community members have face-to-face communications and trust amongst them 
Increases; 
5. Exclusion of outsiders is not expensive; and 
6. Users are able to monitor and enforce the agreements they collectively designed. 
Therefore what these studies show is that the effective governance of a CPR is attainable 
not only by nationalization or privatization, but also under common property regimes. In 
addition, there are studies showing that in some communities there is more than one form 
of property regime or legal system governing the use of a CPR. In fisheries, these case 
studies have revealed the existence of informal rules and institutions, devised at a local 
level, that either restrict or control access to the sea or to the resource itself.]5 The 
presence of more than one legal system or the presence of informal rules, norms and 
customs at the local level can lead to a situation of plurality in the law at a local level. 
This is elaborated further in the next section on legal pluralism, which forms the second 
stream of literature reviewed in this research. The next section also reviews the 
implications of such plurality in fisheries management. 
2.2 Legal Pluralism 
The law can be regarded as the "sovereign" or "rule of recognition" which is essentially 
given, afforded by the factual power of the government (Griffiths, 1989:3). Moore 
defines the law as 
"a very complex aggregation of principles, norms, ideas, rules, practices, and 
the activities of agencies of legislation, administration, adjudication and 
enforcement, backed by political power and legitimacy" (Moore, 1973 :719). 











However, it has been identified that between the governmg political body and the 
individual, there are interposed various smaller organized semi-autonomous social fields 
to which the individual "belongs" (Moore, 1973:721). Within these social fields, the 
actions of individuals are regulated, and compliance can be coerced or induced through 
customs and rules devised by individuals (Moore, 1973:721,743) or legal orders (Weber, 
1954: 17, cited by Griffiths, 1986:40). 
Therefore at the local level, there are different normative and cognitive orders generated 
and maintained in a social field (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2001: 11). These may not be 
very distinguishable, obscured by a mixture of customs, norms and rules used at the local 
level (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2001: 11). This is often referred to as local law, which 
is defined as the mixture of customary (or folk) law, new forms of self-regulation, 
elements of old and new state law, donor laws and social norms that are expressed and 
used at a local level (Benda-Beckmann and Spiertz, 1997 cited by Meinzen-Dick and 
Pradhan 200 I). 
Therefore legal pluralism is "the presence in a social field of more than one legal order" 
(Griffiths, 1968: 1). 16 Legal pluralism does not describe a situation regarding the law or 
legal system, but one of a social nature. A situation of legal pluralism is when there is a 
presence of various local laws, customs, norms or rules used at a local level that regulate 
i~dividual actions and decisions, and even coerce or induce compliance at a local level. 
Woodman (1991 :35, cited by Prill-Bret, 1994:688) observes that legal pluralism IS 
created in any of three ways: 
1. A people observing a customary or local law may be immersed in a field of state 
law when inhabited areas are brought within control of the country's governing 
authority. 
2. A people observing a customary or local law who migrate into an area under state 
jurisdiction may still retain their customs and cultural identities. 
16 Examples of legal orders are state law, religious law, customary law, donor law and local law. (Meinzen-











3. A new form of customary or local law may emerge within a state. 
For the purpose of this dissertation, legal pluralism is only going to be applied in the 
realm of property right regimes that govern ePRs. Property rights have been regarded as 
unitary and fixed, rather than dynamic and diverse; thus policy makers have attempted to 
consolidate well-defined property rights (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 200 I: I 0). However, 
in reality there are different bundles of property rights that exist, and multiple legal and 
normative frameworks can coexist (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 200 I: 10). This case study 
seeks to determine whether the presence of norms and rules amongst fishers from the 
community of Hangberg constitutes legal plurality. 
State or government law and regulations on property rights are referred to as the formal 
legal order; the authoritative governing power of the country enacts legislation that is to 
be adhered to by all citizens in their jurisdiction. Norms, customs and rules at the local 
level are recognized by lawyers as 'socially enforced binding rules' (Moore, 1973:745). 
In this research, these are referred to as the informal legal order which consists of 
informal rules and norms created and enforced by a particular group of people in society, 
and that may not be adhered to by all citizens. Ostrom et al. (1999) describes the 
evolution of informal rules and social norms as a result of the interactions between users 
of the CPR that is dependent on the social capital between the users. This is briefly 
reviewed in the next section. 
2.2.1 Evolution of informal rules 
Informal rules among CPR users evolve over time because not all users have the same 
interests or objectives. Four main kinds of CPR users can be identified: 
I. Narrow self-interested users who never cooperate in dilemmas - 'free-riders'; 
2. Those unwilling to cooperate unless assured that they will not be exploited; 












4. Genuine altruists trying to achieve higher returns for the group as a collective. 
(Ostrom et aI., 1999:279) 
If there is high social capital amongst CPR users, interactions will favour those who gain 
trust of others through reciprocity (Ostrom et aI., 1999:279). In time, other users will 
become more willing to work with them to manage CPR dilemmas, increasing their 
benefits (Ostrom et aI., 1999:279). The social capital Ostrom refers to is the connections 
between individuals and entities, the social networks that include people who trust and 
assist each other, and relationships between individuals and firms. Pretty (2003) describes 
three kinds of connectedness: bonding, bridging and linking. 
"Bonding social capital describes the link between people with similar 
objectives often in local groups ... ; bridging social capital describes the 
capacity of these groups to make links with others that may have different 
views; and linking describes the capacity of such groups to engage with 
external agencies, either to influence their policies or draw on useful 
resources" (Pretty, 2003:1913). 
Therefore, social capital encourages trust and reciprocity between people who can then 
develop common rules, norms and sanctions that are mutually agreed upon to ensure that 
group interests are complementary with those of individuals (Pretty, 2003: 1913). 
In a review of various access restrictions to sea resources, Durrenberger and Palsson state 
the following: 
"the common property concept is neither universal nor natural. Where it does 
exist, there may be control of access through informal and even illegal means, 
control of information, intimidation, gear destruction, or other 
methods .... where fishermen defend fishing spots against others, there is a 
kind of ownership" (Durrenberger and Palsson, 1987:511). 
More and more case studies are revealing the various kinds of unspoken informal rules 











territorial, in the form of informal governance institutions, or economIc control 
mechanisms, to mention a few. 
2.2.2 Evidence of Informal Rules: types and places 
Ostrom (1999:509) categorizes the different types of informal rules into seven rule types 
from various case studies over 14 years. These are described as follows. 
1. Boundary rules: rules that affect the characteristics of the participants by 
controlling the type of participants who interact with each other. The aim is to 
have participants who have long-term interests in the sustainability of the resource 
and the community, and who have a level of trust and reciprocity. The 
participants are restricted by various rules; for example, residency, citizenship, 
ethnicity, clan/caste, the technology they use or by how they acquire 
appropriation rights. 
2. Position rules: define positions and the capabilities and responsibilities of those 
holding positions. 
3. Authori(v rules: "affect the actions that participants in positions may, must, or 
must not do" (Ostrom, 1999: 513). These rules can include specifications on 
locations, when a resource is permitted to be harvested, and how many units of 
the resource are allowed to be harvested in a given period. 
4. Scope rules: affect the outcomes that are allowed, mandated, or forbidden; 
therefore they can limit harvesting activities in some regions. 
5. Aggregation rules: Affect how individual actions are transformed into final 
outcomes. 
6. Information rules: affect the kind of information present or absent in a situation. 
Smaller and informal systems often rely on voluntary exchange of information. 
7. Payoff rules: Affect assigned costs and benefits to actions and outcomes by the 
imposition of fines, incarceration, or by the loss of appropriation rights. 
Case studies in small-scale fisheries have revealed the informal systems that are used to 











order to create a wider context In which to examine the informal fishery In the 
Karbonkelberg. 
Informal institutions that regulate the number ofJishers 
The trawling fishery in the New York Bight region, USA, has a fishermens' cooperative 
specializing in the whiting fishery. They have access to the best whiting grounds; they 
limit entry into the fishery and establish catch quotas among members, maintaining high 
prices for members (Berkes et aI., 1989:92). The cooperative has a closed membership 
policy and controls access to docking space, effectively excluding non-members from 
whiting grounds and markets. Estimation of what the cooperative can sell to the regional 
market determines the quotas given to members (Berkes et aI., 1989:92). The cooperative 
is seen as flexible and helps address the problem of access in the eyes of fishermen. 
Informal institutions that control information 
In Newfoundland, Canada, fishers controlled production-related information which 
governs access to the resource (Anderson, 1979). Such information and knowledge would 
include the location of the fish and the most effective tactics of catching them for the 
successful exploitation of sea resources. 
Informal institutions of territories that restrict access 
The Maine lobster resource, USA, although vulnerable to overharvesting, has shown 
stability since 1947 (Berkes et aI., 1989:92). Although the government has regulations on 
the lobster fishery in Maine, they do not limit the number of licenses. There is a 
traditional fishing rights system which excludes anyone who is not accepted by the 
community. In the Maine lobster industry, the fishers defend territories where fishing is 
good (Acheson and Gardner, 2004). In the eyes of the fishers, these territories are seen as 
their property. Using cost-benefit logic on costs of losses in gear and catch versus 
potential benefits from access to better fishing grounds, fishers can either defend a 
territory or incur the cost of invading another territory (Acheson and Gardner, 2004). If 
fishers organize to defend themselves then they keep other fishers out; if they cannot or 











deny community outsiders access to their territory. A similar example is found in New 
Zealand in two crayfishing villages. In one community, fishers were given 'de facto 
usufruct rights' to fish while they were there, in another community, each fisher defended 
their gears, boats and fishing spots that are bought and sold as fishing units (Levine, 
(1984) cited by Durrenberger and Palsson, 1987: 511). 
Informal systems that control types of gear used 
The "cultural principles of ecological interdependence and social justice" underline the 
collective regulation of fishing along the Coromandel Coast of Tamil Nadu, India 
(Bavinck, 1996:476). The Coromandel Coast has 232 hamlets, each administered by a 
council called panchayats that regulate and control local affairs along the coast. In the 
northern reaches of the Coromandel Coast there are specific gear bans pronounced by the 
councils: the kachaavalai (bait traps for snails) and the ray net (Bavinck, 1996:479). 
These bans were administered by the councils because the introduction of the snail traps 
had a negative effect on the small fish that the fishers harvested, and also to ensure 
equality and fairness because fishers felt that not everyone would benefit from using the 
gears. 
Informal institutions of differential access to limit access 
Fishermen in Newfoundland, Canada, formed groups according to gear types and 
established formal fishing regulations which could be enforced by a fisheries officer 
(Martin, 1979). They limited other fishers who used other kinds of gear access to some 
areas and kept them for themselves. 
Each case study is based on a distinct social, economic and physical environment; the 
informal rules which emerged are specific to these environments, and are justified by 
perceived needs. Although none of these rules in the previous examples were initiated by 
state, they are considered to be legitimate by the communities and by the fishers who 
adhere to them. In some cases, national governments have adopted informal rules as part 











2.2.3 Legal pluralism and Legitimacy 
It is a common assumption that the government is the only institution that has the power 
to enact and enforce a particular legal order for the governance of ePRs. Although the 
government is an important legitimating institution, it is not the only one; local 
community institutions (community, village or group of users) can establish their own 
legal order, including their own property regimes (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan (200 I). 
Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan conceptualize property rights as "claims to use or control 
resources by an individual or group that are recognized as legitimate by a larger 
collectivity" (200 I: II). They posit that property rights are only as strong as the institution 
or collective that supports them. Following this argument, it is thus possible that the 
property rights established by local community institutions may be regarded as more 
relevant, legitimate or important than the rights which the government institutes. Thus 
legality does not necessarily imply that the laws or management regimes are seen as 
legitimate: "To be legitimate, a management system must be justified according to some 
moral principles and values" (lentoft, 2000: 142). 
Weber (1978 cited by Jentoft, 2000: 143) views legitimacy as an "impression created by 
the affecting interests' decision and judgement". In relation to fisheries management, 
Jentofi conveys that this concept of legitimacy calls for research on "users' 
interpretations and opinions on issues such as rationality, equity and fairness" 
(2000: 143). Jentofi (2000) also suggests that this is rarely considered either prior to or 
after the design and implementation of fisheries management schemes. Jentofi reports 
that governments rely on the input they get from organized user-groups. Unfortunately, 
many of the users do not belong to these groups; those who do often go unheard in the 
decision making process. The organisations which the government consult do not 
represent the user-groups (fishers), rather present their own personal interests, and as a 
result, the management system may not have support at grass-root level (Jentofi, 
2000: 143). 
Legitimacy is thus important because it influences how people respond to laws, rules or 











choose to a regulatory regime that they perceive to not be in their interest or legitimate. 
The first response is described as an "exit", where fishers "show their discontent by 
disobeying the rules that the management system has produced" (Hirschman, 1975 in 
Jentoft, 2000: 141). The second response is "voice"; fishers "carry their disappointments 
to the forum ... to try and influence the managers by winning general or peer group 
support for their criticisms" (Hirschman, 1975 in Jentoft, 2000:141). Voice can be 
expressed publicly (through media), indirectly (through interested organizations) or 
directly (to courts or to the management agency) (Jentoft, 2000). 
To sum up, the government is not the only legitimating institution able to set laws. 
Fishing communities can have their own informal rules. The plurality of legal orders in a 
fishing community due to the presence of informal rules does not always imply that the 
fishers will not comply with state law. However, non-compliance can result if the fisher's 
perception is that the state law is not legitimate and they follow Hirschman's exit 
response. Depending on which law and definition of rights the fishers and the 
government are abiding to, legal pluralism may also cause conflict. In this case study, it 
is argued that the fishers in the Karbonkelberg have adopted an exit strategy in 
Hirschman's terms, which has resulted in conflict and non-compliance. 
2.2.4 Legal pluralism and conflict 
Conflicts emerge when the interests of two or more parties clash, and at least one of the 
parties pursues and asserts its interests at the expense of another party's interest (FAO, 
1998: 199). Conflict does not always mean violence, and does not always end with a 
negative outcome. In terms of CPR management, conflict is often assumed to be related 
to difference in material interests between stakeholders (Adams et a\., 2003: 1916). 
However, the issues can be much wider. Conflicts are not only of conflicting material 
interests, but are also due to different interpretations of what the key issues of resource 












I. The knowledge of the empirical context. The resource user will have direct 
personal experience, whereas other stakeholders will have insights from 
theoretical and empirical research to perceive what the problem is. 
2. Knowledge of laws. The local user of the CPR may not have the knowledge of the 
legal and institutional frameworks which often bind the state to act in a particular 
way. 
3. Beliefs, ideas and ideologies. Ideas based on either wisdom about theory or on 
informal! 'folk' knowledge, coupled with moral convictions, religious beliefs or 
norms all influence how people evaluate and understand what the key problem is. 
(Adams et aI., 2003: 1916) 
Conflicts are sparked when there is a perception that "one group is gaining (or, in 
economic terms, maximizing their utility) at the expense of another" (Bennett et aI., 
200 I :366). There are seven main causes for conflicts in fisheries. 
\. Competition for fish stocks and space l7 that Bavinck insightfully states IS a 
struggle for income and livelihood (Bavinck, 2005:809); 
2. A difference in priorities pursued by different fisheries players (Charles, 
1992:383); 
3. Demographic change by a sharp influx of newcomers that adversely affects the 
economic or ecological well-being in other sectors (Bennett et a\., 200 1:367); 
4. Institutional failure in relation to the ability of the formal or informal institutions 
to withstand and adapt to change (Bennett et aI., 200 I); 
5. Developmental pressures; for example, government increasing the industrial 
fisheries sectors at the expense of traditional fishers (Bennett et aI., 2001 :367); 
6. Structural injustices (legislation that restricts or denies a group within society 
access to a resource (Bennett et aI., 200 1:367); 
7. Plurality (in laws, culture, norms) (Bavinck, 2005). 
Conflicts arise due to plurality because different bodies of law compete for "the loyalty of 
a group of people subject to them" (Prill-Brett, 1994: 687). Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 











(200 I: II) observe that "laws are but one resource used in the strategies of individuals and 
groups to acquire, establish, protect and continue their rights". Individuals can make use 
of different laws to "rationalize and legitimize their claims, decisions and 
behaviour ... depending on which law or interpretation of law they believe is most likely 
to support their claim" (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 200 I: II). They caution that if more 
than one legal order is applied at the same time, people will be abiding to different orders 
and definitions of rights, and the assurance of predictability can be eroded. Following 
this train of thought, the overlap of different legal orders or legal systems prescribing 
varying uses of the same CPR resource can result in conflict between users, if the users 
and the state officials are abiding to different laws and definitions of rights. 
The Coromandel Coast in Tamil Nadu, southern India is a good example of this. Bavinck 
(2005) describes how there are three different sea tenure systems. The first tenure system 
is rules made by the lIur panchayat, or hamlet councils. These give territorial privilege 
and regulate harmful technology. Secondly, the trawler owner association also have their 
own rules limiting the size of the trawler fishing group. Thirdly, the government of Tamil 
Nadu's Marine Fishing Regulation Act of 1983 determines where trawler and small-scale 
fishing activities are conducted. These three tenure systems are administered in the same 
area and each have their own enforcement mechanisms and sanctions. Therefore, fishers' 
response is highly dependent on which legal order they are following, which may oppose 
each other. 
Charles (1992) and Warner (2000: II cited by Bennett et aI., 200:368) propose typologies 
of conflicts, which Bennett et al. (2001:369) combines. A summary of the types of 











Table 1. Types of conflicts. (Charles (1992); Warner (2000) and Bennett et al. (200t)) 
Charles' typology of fishery conflicts 
Jurisdiction Management Internal External 
conflicts mechanism Allocation Allocation 
conflicts conflicts conflicts 
Over who owns Over how Resulting from Resulting from 
and has access policy is how different how fishery 
control to what carried out; e.g. fishery groups and 
the consultative stakeholders 'outside 
process harvest interact activities' 
levels, or interact 
enforcement 
Warner's typology of natural resource conflicts 
Intra micro- Inter micro- Micro-macro 
micro conflicts micro conflicts conflicts 
Over boundary Resulting from Resulting from 
disputes, lack of co- cultural 
community operation disputes, 
differences, between contradictory 
elite capture of communities, resource needs, 
benefits disparities of disputes 
wealth, and between project 
between new sponsors and 
migrants and the community, 
initial resident and 
community environmental 
problems 
Bennett et al. typology of fisheries conflicts 
Type I Type II Type III Type IV Type V 
Over who Over how Resulting from Resulting Resulting 
controls the fishery is issues between from between fishers 
fishery; e.g. controlled; e.g different groups interaction and non-fishery 
access issues, over of fishers (based between issues like the 
exclusion from enforcement on ethinicity, fishers and environment, 
access issues, quota language, other marine politics, 
allocation, etc religion); resource corruption, 
between different users economic 
scales of fishers change, etc 
(e.g artisanal, 
industrial) 
2.3 Relevance of literature to the research 
It can be seen that over time studies have provided evidence that there is more than one 











sustainable. The significance of this evidence is its challenge to the ideology that sea 
resources are best governed under state control or private property, as Hardin and others 
claimed. 18 This evidence also raises questions: Are these informal rules present in small-
scale fishing communities in South Africa today? Do these informal rules play an 
important role in dictating the behaviour and fishing patterns of fishers today, and if so 
how? 
In the context of this research, there is little known about the presence of informal 
institutions in South African fishing communities. There is also little known as to 
whether these informal rules cause conflicts between the state and fishers, and between 
fishing sectors, resulting in non-compliance. This gap in the literature is crucial, as the 
government of South Africa has gone through a period of rapid transformation in the 
governance of CPRs, especially sea resources under the Marine Living Resources Act of 
1998. This information will also be useful because these conflicts could help explain and 
better understand the reason and nature of non-compliance in some South African small-
scale fishing communities. Non-compliance in the Karbonkelberg is important because 
non-compliance can erode the potential conservation and fisheries management benefits 
of the MPA (CPMPA, 2002). 
Government regulations that facilitate efforts of CPR users to self-organize to address 
CPR problems are more likely to be adopted by the community (Ostrom et al., 1999:281). 
Regimes that assume that all decisions must be made centrally, or regimes that ignore 
resource problems, are more likely to be opposed by the community (Ostrom et al., 
1999:281). If rules are imposed by the state without consulting local CPR users, "local 
users may engage in a game of 'cops and robbers' with outside authorities" (Ostrom et 
al., 1999:281). Following this argument, externally imposed institutions can be greatly 
resisted by the community if those institutions do not acknowledge, complement or 
support their informal rules and institutions. This is what this research, through a legal 
pluralism perspective, is aiming to investigate. 












The information sought for in this research is qualitative in nature. Therefore a qualitative 
social science methods approach was employed in the research. 
3.1 The methods 
Information was gathered via interviews, direct observation, focus groups and 
documentation. The interviews, focus groups and direct observations were carried out in 
the field research component, which was initially scheduled for six weeks. The field 
component was however carried out over a period of three months: June, July and 
September 2006. This was to give enough time to introduce the research to the 
community members in Hangberg and to build rapport with the fishers. Review of 
documentation was ongoing throughout the research. The limitations of the methods used 
to gather information are discussed in section 3.4. 
3.1.1 Research process 
The field component was carried out in partnership with Maria Hauck, another researcher 
from the NORSA fisheries compliance project. Mrs. Hauck has over ten years research 
experience in compliance issues in small-scale fishing communities and played a 
significant role in the research. Although the research was carried out as a partnership, 
Mrs. Hauck's research included case studies along the whole west coast of the Western 
Cape Province. With respect to this case study, Mrs Hauck focused more on the law 
enforcement and institutional aspects relating to the informal WCRL fishery in the 
Karbonkelberg, while I focused more on the informal rules and how the informal fishery 
is organised. All interviews, observations and focus groups were carried out with Maria 
Hauck. Both researchers followed up on contacts and were both involved in organising 
interviews with informants. Mrs. Hauck's experience and participation in the research 
was very valuable in identifying key informants to interview, in guiding the interviews, 











Furthermore, the presences of two female researchers on this case study of mixed 
ethnicity (of Canadian and Tanzanian descent), aided in gaining rapport with the 
community. The fishers targeted in this research are all males, who according to the 
national law are involved in an illegal activity. The presence of female researchers posed 
less of a threat, and was less intimidating to the fishers and the community of Hangberg, 
than if two male researchers had entered the community. 
3.1.2 Participants 
Relevant stakeholders to be interviewed were identified as: 
Table 2. List of research stakeholders 
Stakeholder Number 
interviewed 
Legal and illegal rock lobster fishers in Hangberg 12 
Rock lobster salespersons within Hangberg 2 
Boat owners or renters, fisher~ear owners or renters 2 
Fishery officers working in Hout Bay who would include MCM 6 
staff in Hout Bay and MP A staff. 
Hangberg community leaders and HanRbe~g community members 6 
Initial contact with the manager of the MPA patrol staff and the head MCM officer for 
Hout Bay through which the other enforcement staff were contacted was initiated through 
Dr. Merle Sowman, a researcher in the Environmental Evaluation Unit at the University 
of Cape Town. Initial contact with the illegal fishers was also achieved through Dr. 
Sowman who introduced us to a Hangberg community member who was also a fisher, 
and acted as the gatekeeper to Hangberg. Due to the unfamiliarity of Hangberg and the 
security in the area, the initial interview with this respondent was carried out in Hout 
Bay. All subsequent interviews were then conducted within Hangberg, which opened up 
opportunities to walk through Hangberg. 
Due to the fact that the research was targeting participants in the illegal fishery, some of 
the participants were initially guarded and not open to share details. It was therefore very 
important for the research not to be perceived by the community as a threat or 
endangerment to the fishers. To gain rapport with the community, Hangberg was 











researchers amongst them, and to demonstrate that our presence was not a threat in any 
way. All visits to Hangberg and interviews were kept very informal, allowing the fishers 
to get to know the researchers and ask questions. 
In total, interviews were conducted with ten illegal fishers interviewed either in the 
community or during direct observations, and two of the four legal small-scale WCRL 
permit holders were interviewed. Over thirty illegal fishers participated in the direct 
observations conducted on four separate occasions. 19 The total number of illegal fishers 
could not be estimated during research due to the limited time available for the research. 
Besides the fishers, five MCM staff, fourteen Table Mountain National Park Staff and 
seven community members were also either interviewed or involved in participatory 
observation or focus group workshops see appendix 6.2 for details. The few numbers of 
participants involved in the research was primarily due to time constraints and the use of 
a gatekeeper, discussed further in section 3.4. 
3.1.3 Interviews 
The identification of and access to respondents was done through a combination of quota 
sampling and snowball sampling. The quota sampling approach requires that a specific 
number of people from each of the relevant categories of stakeholders be interviewed 
(Neuman, 2000: 197). However, because the information on informal rules is centred on 
the fishers and their behaviour, more fishers were interviewed than other stakeholders. A 
gatekeeper20 was used to introduce a number of fishers to the research and to familiarise 
them with the research objectives. After the first interview, more fishers were identified 
without the use of the gatekeeper, but rather using snowball sampling technique. 
Snowball sampling, "(or network, chain, referral or reputational sampling) is a method 
for identifying and sampling (or selecting) the cases in a network" (Neuman, 2000: 199). 
The network in this case refers to the fishers in Hout Bay. The assumption is that most 
fishers in the community are connected to one another through direct or indirect linkages. 
This method was found to be very useful because all the fishers knew each other and 
19 Section 3.1.5 provides more detail on the direct observations conducted 












lived within the vicinity of the fishing village of Hangberg (limitations on this approach 
are discussed in section 3.4). 
All interviews were conducted in the field in the participant's natural local environment 
after initial contact and introductions were made. All interviews were semi-structured. 
The semi-structured interview approach made use of open-ended questions, giving room 
for the interviewee to elaborate answers, and also allowing for discussions around the 
topic. Interview questions were categorised into themes (see Box 2). The purpose of the 
interviews was to encourage the stakeholders to communicate the ways in which fisher 
behaviour and patterns are controlled among themselves, and to examine the behaviours 
that they are familiar with or have experience of. The interviews focused on more on the 
control mechanisms that were outside the realm of the national law. If the interviewee 
identified control mechanisms, then a second interview was carried out to confirm and 
clarify the mechanisms identified. 
Box O. Interview questions: themes and concepts 
1. Respondent's life history: their background and knowledge of community. This 
was used as an anthropological method to help establish rapport and understand 
the social context. 
2. Interaction/relationship among fishers: types of fisher; individual or group systems. 
3. Control of fishers: how are fishers identified; are fishers per fishing spot 
controlled? 
4. Control of boats: types used, and are they owned or to rent? 
5. Control of gear: type used in certain spots or areas inshore. What gears do 
individual fishers and fishers in groups use? Are they to rent or owned? 
6. Control of information on fishing areas 












3.1.4 Focus group interviews 
Two focus groups21 were conducted with the Table Mountain National Park (TMNP) 
Marine Unit. Both researchers also participated in the focus groups, but Maria Hauck was 
responsible for coordinating with the participants and also facilitated the focus groups. 
My role was more of an observer who listened to the participants to try and confirm the 
presence of informal rules and to elaborate and understand how the rules work. The focus 
groups were held in TMNP facilities in the Cape of Good Hope Protected Area. The first 
workshop, held on July 5th 2006, had six participants, including management, 
administrative staff and the heads of the marine ranger teams. The second workshop, on 
July 6th 2006, included eight marine rangers, responsible for patrolling the marine 
protected areas throughout the Cape Peninsula. 
Box 1. Approach to focus groups (Adapted from Morgan (2001: 147) 
Goal: To answer the research question by (a) clarifying findings of informal rules 
in community, and (b) understanding participants' thinking of how these 
informal rules work. 
• All participants were of similar interest i.e. the TMNP Marine Unit. 
• Specific and general questions set the agenda and guided discussion. 
• Moderator facilitated interaction between participants allowing each 
participant time to contribute into discussion. 
• Moderator allowed discussion to explore new areas relevant to research but 
re-focused off topic remarks. 
The focus group interviews were a mixture of structured and less structured approaches 
so as to understand the participant's thinking as well as to pursue information regarding 
the research question. The agenda for the discussion was set based on information 
obtained from the other interviews. However, there was flexibility, allowing participants 
to talk to each other, and new information or points for discussion were welcomed.22 The 
purpose of focus groups was to identify whether the participants were aware of the 
organisation of the informal fishery and any of the informal rules amongst fishers. Other 
"I "In focus groups the researcher asks questions from a number of respondents at the same time to 
'stimulate discussion and thereby understand (through further analysis) the meanings and norms which 
underlie the group answers' (Bloor. et al., 200 1:43)" (Marvasti, 2004:22). 











related factors, such as the challenges of non-compliance of the fishers and management 
challenges, were also discussed. The limitations of this approach are discussed in section 
3.4. 
3.1.5 Participant/Direct observation 
Initially, the intent was to create opportunities for participant observation among the 
illegal fishers. However, during the course of the research, direct observation rather than 
participant observation was carried out on six different occasions. There were three 
primary reasons for this action. Firstly, to become a participant would require long-term 
interaction with the fishers, whereas this was a relatively short-term research. Secondly, 
if complete participant observation was carried out, the act of participating with the 
illegal fishers would have been considered as breaking the law. It was therefore pertinent 
to conduct direct observation among the illegal fishers. Thirdly, the physical constraints 
of going to sea with the illegal fishers meant that participant observation was an 
impractical option, leading to the use of direct observation as a viable alternative. Direct 
observations were carried out with the use of binoculars as an alternative to participant 
observation. The process of gaining access to illegal fishers and creating opportunities 
for observations took several lead-in interviews and the development of relationships. 
There were six opportunities to directly observe the fishers (Table 2). The first two 
opportunities to observe the fishers were from the top of Sentinel Mountain, where the 
locations of where the illegal fishers launch their boats and fish were identified. There 
were two opportunities to observe the fishers while they were out at sea from the rocky 
shores behind Sentinel Mountain. The first day of direct observation at sea was conducted 
at the beginning of the field research, and the second close to the end of the research. 
There were also two opportunities to observe the fishers on their return from sea. 
The aim of the initial observation with the fishers was to map the field, to evaluate 
whether the conceptual formulation of the research questions and objectives was suitable. 
This also allowed the fishers to get comfortable with the presence of researchers 
observing them, with the view to earn their trust. Some informal rules were identified in 











workings of the informal fishery. The second direct observation at sea was carried out 
after the interview process had begun, and once definite informal control rules were 
identified. The aim of the second observation was to identify and confirm the informal 
rules in action in the daily and weekly routines. In addition, the surroundings (what is 
seen), the conversations (what is heard), the actions, the characteristics, and any 
arguments amongst stakeholders were also noted during observation. In addition, there 
were two opportunities where the fishers were observed when returning from sea. 
Additional opportunities to observe the fishers at sea could not be carried out due to the 
fact that the fishers were only out at sea depending on the weather and the presence of 
law enforcement. Furthermore, other relevant stakeholders were also sought to be 
interviewed within a limited time frame for the research (see section 3.4 for limitations 
on methodology). 
3.1.6 Documentation 
In addition to the field research, a variety of documents were reviewed for two purposes. 
Firstly, documents were reviewed to provide the general history and context of the 
research. Such documents included historical studies of the community of Hangberg and 
the establishment of Hout Bay, and documents on the history of fisheries in South Africa. 
Secondly, documents were reviewed to generate a detailed understanding of the formal 
laws governing WCRL under the national system. This is important in order to 
understand the difference between the national laws and the informal rules. These 
documents included legislation and management policies on WCRL, and articles on 











Table 3. Summary of direct observations. 
Place of Place of Number Number of 
Date meeting observation of Hours participants Comments 
Walked through 
Hangberg and used 
Three- common path to Sentinel 
27-Jun-06 
Illegal fisher's Sentinel quarters 
four 
Mountain where we 
resident Mountain of an were shown where the 
hour fishers launch their boats 
and where they normally 
harvest crayfish. 
Walked to the top of 
Hangberg Sentinel mountain with a 
28-Jun-06 
community Sentinel half an 
three 
Hangberg community 
member's Mountain hour member who showed us 
residence where the illegal fishers 
launch their boats from. 
Observed fishers as they 
28-Jun-06 
Illegal fisher's Illegal fisher's 
twelve 
had just returned from 
resident resident 
one 
sea preparing their catch 
for sale. 
Rocky shore Observed fishers as they 
II-Jul-06 
Illegal fisher's behind 
twelve 
prepared bait, when they 
resident Karbonkelberg 
SIX 
were out at sea and as 
Mountain they returned to shore 
Rocky shore Observed fishers as they 
06-Sep-06 
Illegal fisher's behind returned to shore and 
two ten 
resident Karbonkel berg walked with them to 
Mountain their meeting point 
Rocky shore Observed fishers when 
08-Sep-06 
Illegal fisher's behind two and they were out to sea. 
resident Karbonkelberg a half 
over twenty 
Also observed hand-line 
Mountain fishers. 
3.2 Validity 
Validity can be referred to as truth: "interpreted as the extent to which an account 
accurately represents the social phenomena to which it refers" (Marvasti, 2004: \\3). 











I. Respondent validation: useful information gathered from one respondent during 
an interview was followed up in subsequent interviews with the same respondent 
and with other respondents. This helped to confirm the information gathered, 
although at times there were some clear disagreements. For example, while 
talking to one respondent, they mentioned that no small-scale WCRL quotas were 
awarded to anyone from Hangberg. However, after probing other respondents, it 
was learnt that four members from Hangberg received small-scale WCRL quotas 
and other members from Hangberg have shares in companies that received 
commercial WCRL quotas. 
2. Triangulation: aggregating information from different sources. This was carried 
out by using the different methods, i.e. interviews, focus groups and direct 
observation. For example, the modus operandi of the informal fishery was first 
described to us through interviews with two respondents, which was also 
illustrated during the focus groups with the MPA staff The information gathered 
from the interviews and the focus group was validated while directly observing 
the fishers. 
3. Examining deviant cases: Any information gathered that was substantially 
different from the general pattern of responses was probed further. 
3.3 Ethics 
In recognition of various complaints about previous research studies that have unethically 
invaded people's privacy and human rights, this research followed some ethical 
principles. The following ethical principles have been adopted in this research process: 23 
I. Protection of participants: Participants were openly told about the goals and 
objectives of the research. They were also informed that although we are were 
based in the University of Cape Town; the project was initiated by the South 
African government through MCM. From the outset, we were open and 
transparent about the kind of information which was required from the research 
and about the general types of questions which would be asked. This gave the 











participants an opportunity to decide beforehand whether or not they want to 
participate. Although the future use of this research can not be predicted, the spirit 
of the research is to create opportunity for dialogue between the relevant 
stakeholders, with the hope of understanding the issues surrounding non-
compliance in the Karbonkelberg MPA. 
2. Voluntary participation: participants in the research were not psychologically or 
physically forced to participate in the research. Neither was monetary award 
promised to any participant as a means of coercing them to participate in the 
research. 
3. Confidentiality and anonymity: Names of respondents will not be disclosed for 
their protection and to respect their privacy. However, results of the research will 
be made available to the public and to authorities. If a respondent did not want 
whatever information they contributed to be included as part of the research 
findings, then their wish was respected and no reference was made to information 
which they supplied directly. 
4. Neutrality and objectivity as a researcher while developing relationships in the 
community. As an observer, care was taken to avoid blurring the line between 
professional relationships versus a personal relationship with the people in the 
field, so as to avoid biased perspectives. This was difficult because required a 
careful balance between acquiring a rapport with the community in order to gain 
access, and maintaining distance in order to ensure neutrality. Therefore 
questions, requests or suggestive remarks that may have created conflicts of 
interest to either the respondent or to the researcher were avoided as much as 
possible. 
5. Honesty about research: the duration and purpose of the research was made 











research was not misrepresented, and the findings were not altered to fit the 
research objectives. 
3.4 Limitations 
Although precautions were taken in the types of methods that were used to gather 
information, there were some limitations. These are briefly described below. 
1. Language barrier: The community of fishers are primarily Afrikaans speakers, a 
language which is not known to either of the researchers working on this project. 
English was the primary mode of communication with those participants who 
understood it. Translators from within the community were used when required; 
however, there is always a risk of information being lost or misrepresented 
through the translation process. In addition, although some participants said they 
were comfortable speaking in English, the depth of their responses or any 
metaphors or community sayings may have been diluted, thus the real essence of 
their comments may not have been captured to their full extent. 
2. Interview bias: due to the fact that some of the respondents had low education and 
others had difficulty in English, some of the questions were posed as yes or no 
questions rather than open-ended questions. Caution was required, to ensure that 
the language being used did not lead the respondent to answer in a particular way, 
or even to hinder the respondent from answering openly. 
3. Positionality and access to communitv: As a researcher, my ethnicity, cultural 
background and other ascriptive characteristics may have been perceived 
negatively by the community within which the research was carried out. This may 
have limited how open people were to agree to interviews with me, and also how 
much information they were inclined to give out during the interview (Neuman, 
2000:358). That is why few fishers were identified and interviewed to begin with, 











technique was then used to get acquainted with other fishers through them as they 
referred us to other fishers. 
4. Focus groups: Challenges to focus group interviews (Neuman, 2000; Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2000; Gubrium and Holstein, 200 I; Marvasti, 2004: 133-144) as a 
method of research include: 
(i) one person dominating the discussion, 
(ii) respondents reluctance to discuss sensitive topics in the presence of 
others, 
(iii) shy participants, 
(iv) the interviewer managmg group dynamics while asking questions 
simu Itaneously. 
To avoid this, the focus groups were carried out so that each participant was 
involved by having activities to participate in. For example, some questions asked 
each participant to write down their responses; each response was randomly 
mapped on a board and discussed by the whole group. 
5. Gatekeeper: A gatekeeper was used to introduce us to other fishers. To avoid the 
channelling of the research "in line with existing networks of friendship and 
enmity, and equivalent boundaries" (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983:73), or the 
creation of a stigma that "inhibits the cooperation of members" (Neuman, 
2000:352), the use of a gatekeeper was limited only to the beginning of the 
research. Once a relationship with fishers was established, the snowball method 
was adopted. In addition, other stakeholders such as MPA staff and MCM staff 
also provided an introduction to some of the fishers they knew. However, it took a 
long time to be introduced to new fishers through snowballing, due to the amount 
of time required for the fishers to get to know us and become comfortable with 
the situation. This in turn limited the total number of fishers who could be 











6. Time: though the research was spaced over 3 months, interviews were not 
conducted on a daily basis. Participants were busy, or hesitant to give an 
interview. In addition, due to the sensitive nature of the enquiry, some 
respondents were reluctant to open up and give information immediately, and it 
frequently took time until they were comfortable to share information. Thus the 
given time for the field component was not enough time to build a rapport with a 
range of participants and to have enough time to conduct multiple interviews with 
them. Furthermore, the time limitations reduced the number of fishers interviewed 
to only a total of 12 fishers. However, with these twelve, interviews were 
conducted more than once, and seven of them were involved in the full day 
observations. 
The information sought in this research is sensitive because it reveals how the 
informal fishery in the Karbonkelberg is organized. This informal fishery, 
however, is considered illegal under South African law. Therefore, this 
information, if used by the wrong hands, can negatively affect the lives of the 
illegal fishers who participated in the research and could even lead to arrests. 
Hence the confidentiality of the fishers who participated in the research was 
respected. 
Before describing the informal system and the informal rules discovered in the field 











4 BACKGROUND TO THE HOUT BAY CASE STUDY 
This chapter describes the context for this research. This research is based in the 
Karbonkelberg Marine Protected Area, located in Hout Bay, which was established to 
protect the WCRL population. The Karbonkelberg is adjacent to a historical fishing 
community called Hangberg where fishers have lived off the sea since the early 1900s 
(Greene, 1991). However, this area was declared a no fishing zone in 2004, which has 
affected small-scale and subsistence fishers who depend on fishing and who have fished 
the area for generations. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. Section 4.1 describes the geographical and 
socio-economic context of Hangberg. Section 4.2 describes the Karbonkelberg Marine 
Protected Area. 
4.1 Background to Hangberg 
Hangberg is in the harbour town of Hout Bay, located in the Cape Peninsula region of the 
Western Cape Province of South Africa (Figure.2 below). Hangberg is tucked between 
the Karbonkelberg and the Sentinel mountains, and the wooded southern slopes of Table 
Mountain, about 20 km south of Cape Town's downtown centre (see Photo 1). Hangberg 
overlooks the harbour, and neighbours a suburb called 'The Heights'. The original 
inhabitants and descendents of the Hout Bay area are known as the Khoi Khoi (or Khoi 
San) people. The Hout Bay area also received an array of settlers from the 1600s, 
including the English, Dutch and French, who pioneered in establishing industries. 








































4.1.1 Political and Socio-economic background of Hangberg 
The Hout Bay area has a long history of fishing that can be traced back to the Stone Age 
(100-500AD) when the Khoi San were the first people to fish there (Hout Bay Museum, 
2006). Historically, the Khoi San would build a wall, allowing fish to enter a pool with 
the tide, but trapping them as the tide went OUt.24 This made it easier for the fishers to 
harvest, especially because they did not use boats. When the English settlers came they 
introduced boats and the traditional system was overshadowed. The arrival of the 
Trautman began the commercialization of the fishery in the late 1800s, and in the early 
1900s a crayfish exporting business was set up by the Hout Bay Canning Company 
(Greene, 1991). In 1935, the South African government built landing facilities and a 
breakwater. Until the 1940s, the Hout Bay area had two main industries - farming and 
fishing. However, the 1950s-1970s saw a decrease in farming activity, as secondary fish 
processing industries began to emerge in Hout Bay, expanding the fishing industry. The 
resulting increase in labour demand led to an increased influx of labourers. However, the 
apartheid government of that time created firm racial divisions among the residents of 
Hout Bay. 
Prior to the development of South Africa's fishing industry in the 1900s, the 
"Coloured,,25 community were the dominant actors in the fishing sector in the Western 
Cape (Sowman, 2006:6 I). During the development of the fishing industry and the 
introduction of the apartheid regime, those who were formerly classified as "Coloured" 
and "Black,,26 fishers were systematically excluded from attaining direct access to 
resources. In 1950, Hout Bay was declared a "White" area under the Group Areas Act of 
1950. Under this act, the coloured and black communities were forced to re-settle. As the 
fishing industry continued to expand, the council flats built for coloured fishermen 
became overcrowded, and could not accommodate the increasing number of fishers. This 
resulted in growth in informal settlements in the Princess Street area of the harbour. 
24 Respondent D, Interview, 27-Jun-06 
25 Coloured is a former apartheid era term that referred to a diverse group of 'mixed race' people descended 
from slaves, the indigenous Khoi San peoples, black people and European settlers (Isaacs, 2006:52). 
26 Under the previous apartheid era, people were divided along racial lines. Black referred to the generic 
term in South Africa for those ethnic groups identified by apartheid policy as "Indian", "African" or 











Hangberg is one of the areas where council flats were initially built for "Coloured" 
fishermen. 
The continued expansion of the harbour and the monopolization by the S.A Sea Products 
(the former Canning Company) and Irvin and Johnson (I&J) gradually forced small boat 
owners to sell, impacting the lives of small-scale fishermen. From the late 1970s to late 
1980s as the fishing crews in Hout Bay expanded, there were three main groups of 
fishers. 27 Within each group, each crew member had their own job; profits were divided 
among everyone, including the children who assisted on the shore. The skipper received 
the most money. This system worked effectively, but problems arose in the late 1980s 
when the government 'interfered' and required the three groups to amalgamate.28 The 
single fishers group was only entitled to catch an amount equal to one of the original, 
smaller fishers groups, resulting in a shortage in resource. This inevitably led to contlict. 
The apartheid--era racial divisions remain prominent in the Hout Bay community, with 
different standards of housing and infrastructure existing between white, black and 
coloured groups. The small-scale fishing community in Hangberg have been left 
politically marginalized, with large numbers of 'squatters'. Evidence of overcrowding 
and the presence of an informal settlement is seen in Hangberg today (see Photo 2 and 3). 
Levels of unemployment and drug and alcohol abuse are high (Isaacs, 2006, Nicolson, 
2005). In addition, the prevalence of diseases such as HIV I Aids and tuberculosis is high. 
Low levels of education, skills shortages and a lack of necessary capital have limited 
employment opportunities, and reduced people's ability to start up their own business 
venture. During the research process, it was evident that the majority of Hangberg 
residents either work on fishing boats as skippers, or in the fishing processing factories in 
the harbour. It was also apparent that many of the people employed in the fishing industry 
27 These groups seemed to be amongst the Hangberg community and were self organised as a corporation 
that got fishing rights. 
28 Respondent P, Interview, 12-Sept-06. Interview with respondent P was conducted by Maria Hauck and 











were also involved in illegal fishing in order to supplement their income29 . However, the 
majority of the illegal fishers had no formal employment. The illegal fishers from 
Hangberg mainly target WCRL. The WCRL (Jaslis lalandii) are generally found close to 
shore from approximately 23°S, just north of Walvis Bay in Namibia to about 28°S near 
East London in South Africa, with commercial densities from about 25°S in Namibia to 
slightly east ofthe Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. 
4.1.2 Fisheries Transformation 
The Sea Shore Act of 1935 stated its purpose as to provide access to coastal resources to 
all South Africans. The introduction of apartheid in 1948 resulted in planning and 
development laws that restricted poor and black citizens access (Hauck and Sowman, 
2003:38). During this time, the majority of fishing rights were allocated at little cost and 
were held by a small number of white owned companies. Under the new democratic 
government of 1994, equitable participation in the fishing industry was actively sought. 
Access rights have been redistributed to Historically Disadvantaged Individuals or HDIs, 
and share transfers, joint ventures and affirmative action have been encouraged. 
Between 1992 and 1998 a Quota Board increased allocations to HDls in small-scale 
fisheries (Isaacs, 2006:52). However, most of these allocations were to coloureds and 
political and social allies of the coloured vote, rather than to blacks (Isaacs, 2006:52). 
When the MLRA was promulgated in 1998, the Quota Board was abolished, appointing 
responsibility of allocation to the minister. Over 11,000 applications were lodged, 
hampering the state's administrative capability, delaying the allocations and reducing the 
time for holders to fulfil their catches. However, in 2006, Branch and Clark (2006:9) 
report the transformation of the fishing industry as "remarkable", where current figures 
show that HDis account for "75% of the workforce, 77% of the salaries and 62% of the 
TAC". However, section 18(5) of the MLRA only stipulated that allocation of access 
rights should benefit "historically disadvantaged sectors of society"; bona fide fishers 
29 We observed two fishers who joined few illegal fishers during our observations. In addition, the fishers 
interviewed consistently affirmed that fishers who work on the boats or factories sometimes participate in 











were at times left out of the allocation process in favour of other HDIs (Isaacs, 2006 and 
Sowman, 2006). 
Indeed the transformation efforts of the past decade have been progressive. However, the 
focus on HOIs can potentially leave bona fide fishers on the periphery. With the status of 
an HOI, anyone can effectively apply for a fishing permit, regardless of their previous 
involvement or experience in fishing (Isaacs 2006:53). Within Hangberg, there are 
individuals who are both bona fide fishers and HOIs; however, due to the limitations on 
quotas, they remain unable to access a permit, in spite of their historical background in 
and dependence on fishing. With no long-term right, and without any possibility of a 
subsistence right to support their livelihood, these bona fide fishers may be left with little 
choice but to exploit WCRL illegally, because of need. This is the case in the 
Karbonkelberg sanctuary. 
Small-scale fisheries 
The MLRA also for the first time recognized and gave access to marine resources to 
subsistence fishers3o, and appointed a Subsistence Fisheries Task Group (SFTG) to advise 
on the management of subsistence fisheries. In 2000, MCM as a pilot programme invited 
applications for WCRL subsistence fishing permits. 3431 applications were received but 
only 1700 permits were issued. For subsistence or 'artisanal' fishers who hope to gain 
commercial rights, the SFTG recommended a sub category of 'limited commercial', as an 
intermediary step between levels (Isaacs, 2006:54). The SFTG also recommended that 
high value resources such as rock lobster and abalone would be more economically 
profitable if exported rather than consumed in the subsistence sector, giving subsistence 
fishers opportunity to boost themselves commercially. Thus within the same year, the 
subsistence pilot programme was converted to limited commercial rights. 
30 Section 19 of the MLRA defines a subsistence fisher as "a natural person who regularly catches fish for 
personal consumption or for the consumption of his or her dependents, including one who engages from 
time to time in the local sale or barter of excess catch, but does not include a person who engages on a 











The illegal fishing by fishers from Hangberg is of significance to the government, as they 
poach in the Karbonkelberg Marine Protected Area, declared as a West Coast Rock 
Lobster no-take zone. The next section describes the location of the Karbonkelberg and 
its purpose. 
4.2 Marine Protected Areas and the Karbonkelberg sanctuary 
The World Conservation Union (IUCN) defines the term 'Marine Protected Area' or 
MPA as follows: 
"any area of intertidal or subtidal terrain, together with its overlying waters 
and associated flora, fauna, historical and cultural features, which has been 
reserved by legislation to protect part or all of the enclosed environment" 
(IUCN, 1988:Section 17.38b). 
An MPA can be also be loosely defined as follows: 
"an area of sea especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of 
biodiversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, and managed 
through legal or other effective means" (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2003:4). 
The second definition of an MP A has been adopted for the purpose of this dissertation. 
In 1988, the IUCN General Assembly called upon national governments, international 
agencies and the non-governmental community "To provide for the protection, 
restoration, wise use, understanding and enjoyment of the marine heritage of the world in 
perpetuity through the creation of a global, representative system of marine protected 
areas .... " (IUCN, 1988: Section 17.38). It is with this mandate that South Africa has 
establ ished MP As along its coast I ine. There are 19 MPAs, and their management is 
shared between South African National Parks (SAN Parks), Marine Coastal Management 











4.2.1 The Karbonkelberg sanctuary 
The Karbonkelberg MPA area is part of the Table Mountain National Park Marine 
Protected Area (TMNP MPA), also referred to as the Cape Peninsula Marine Protected 
Area (CPMPA) (Figure. 3 below). It was established in 2004 with the following purpose: 
1. To protect the marine environment and the marine biodiversity 
2. To allow over-exploited fish populations to recover, and to protect breeding 
stocks of economically important species 
3. To reduce conflict between competing users of the MPA 
4. To encourage economic activities for the previously disadvantaged communities 
in the vicinity of the MPA. (CPMPA, 2002) 
The TMNP MPA is run by Table Mountain National Park (TMNP) in conjunction with 
MCM. The TMNP MP A surrounds the whole of the Cape Peninsula and is managed and 
patrolled by SANParks, who are contracted by MCM. SAN Parks is responsible for the 
administrative and inshore law enforcement, and for educational activities within the 
MPA zone. SAN Parks is also responsible for enforcing the laws applying to national 
parks. MCM enforces the regulations regarding fishing and is responsible for the issuing 
permits, quotas and law enforcement. 
The Karbonkelberg is one of six 'sanctuary' or 'no-take zones' within the TMNP MPA. 
'No-take' zones are "areas of the sea that are permanently closed to all fishing" (Gell and 
Roberts, 2003). This restricted zone shown in Figure.3 below extends from the Sentinel 
in Hout Bay to Oudekraal, and 3.3 nautical miles offshore at the widest point (OEA T, 
2004a). The purpose of the 'no-take' zones according to Section 6 of the MPA 
regulations, is to "allow marine species and ecosystems in those zones to exist in a 
natural state to further fulfil South Africa's commitments to the conservation of 
biodiversity and to enhance eco-tourism opportunities" (OEAT, 2004b). 
The establishment of the Karbonkelberg, although well-intended for conservation 











of the Hangberg fishers. In addition, a large number of fishers in Hangberg are without 
legal rights to marine resources. This is primarily due to the removal of WCRL 
subsistence rights, the limited number of small-scale commercial fishing quotas available 
and failing to adequately complete quota applications because of the difficulty of 
understanding the forms. As a result, traditional fishing livelihoods have been deemed 
illegal (Nicolson, 2005). These factors have led to an increase in illegal fishing 
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5 LEGAL PLURALITY IN THE KARBONKELBERG: 
NATIONAL LAW AND INFORMAL RULES 
The Karbonkelberg was identified as one of the key areas in the TMNP MPA with a high 
non-compliance rate. This was due to the identification of illegal fishing practices among 
focus group participants. As mentioned in section 3.1, this research aims to understand 
the non-compliance in the Karbonkelberg through a legal pluralism perspective. The 
approach will identify whether there is a plurality of legal orders present in the area, and 
will explore the extent to which non-compliance is a direct result of conflicting legal 
orders. 
The formal or national law requires a person wishing to harvest WCRL to obtain either a 
commercial, limited commercial or a recreational access right under the MLRA. These 
access rights are long-term, for a period of 15 years, and are allocated through an 
expensive process with many evaluative criteria. The permit holder is also prohibited 
from fishing within the Karbonkelberg no-take zone. 
The organised illegal fishery in Karbonkelberg sanctuary is referred to as the informal 
fishery. The term 'poacher' and 'illegal fisher' are at times used interchangeably in 
reference to the fishers who harvest WCRL without formal access rights in the 
Karbonkelberg. The term 'poacher' is used by enforcement staff, but the illegal fishers in 
Hangberg refer to and regard themselves as fishers, not poachers. In the informal fishery, 
the organized groups of poachers have no formal form of access right. They have 
developed their own system of harvesting WCRL, and their own informal rules among 
themselves. This informal fishery causes a particular compliance problem, as the 
poachers harvest WCRL in the Karbonkelberg no-take zone. 
The first part of this chapter describes the formal laws and the challenges in compliance. 











5.1 The Formal Legal Order: national legislation and management of WCRL 
The laws and management policies governing the harvest of WCRL in South Africa 
reflect how the ideology of the 'Tragedy of the Commons' affects fisheries policy. 
In South Africa, the sea and seashore, and the management of fisheries are 
nationalised. Access or property rights in South African fisheries are allocated in 
the form of quotas by the national government, following principles such as 
sustainability, equity, and justice. These principles are set out in statutes such as the 
Bill of Rights and the Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA). 
5.1.1 Legislation and management of WCRL 
Prior to 1994, marine resources were governed by various national laws. The Sea Shore 
Act of 1935 invested ownership of the sea and seashore in the State President, and 
controlled access through quotas. After the democratic elections of 1994, new policies 
and legislation were implemented under the new statutory framework of the constitution. 
The Constitution and the Marine Living Resources Act 
The Bill of Rights, enacted with the final Constitution in 1996, provides the statutory 
framework for South African law, including fisheries management decisions. Under the 
new Constitution, a Marine Fisheries White paper was published to "develop a fair 
system of allocating access rights, particularly to those who were previously denied such 
access" (Hauck and Sowman, 2003 :49). This led to the promulgation of the Marine 
Living Resources Act (MLRA) passed in September 1998. The purpose of the MLRA is 
as follows: 
"to provide for the conservation of the marine ecosystem, the long-term sustainable 
utilisation of marine living resources and the orderly access to exploitation, 
utilisation and protection of certain marine living resources" (MLRA, 1998). 
The MLRA incorporated the democratic and constitutional principles of sustainability, 
optimum utilization, stability, equity and transformation within South African fisheries. 











marine resources and allocating access rights. In terms of equity and transformation, the 
MLRA acknowledges the need to restructure the fishery industry to address historical 
imbalances and to achieve equity within all branches of the industry (section 2m of the 
MLRA, 1998). In keeping with this, the MLRA encourages the Minister of Environment 
and Tourism to pay particular regard to those from historically disadvantaged sectors of 
society when allocating rights (MLRA, 1998: section 18). 
Management of the WCRL fishery 
The management of WCRL falls under the jurisdiction of the Chief Directorate of Marine 
and Coastal Management, or MCM. MCM is a directorate of the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT). MCM is responsible for controlling boat 
launching sites, conducting research on stocks, allocating and managing rights, and 
regulating recreational fishing for WCRL and other species (MCM, 2006). MCM 
controls the harvesting of WCRL through six primary control mechanisms implemented 
through science and research (Branch and Clark, 2006:7). These primary control 
mechanisms are described below. 
I. Total Allowable Catches or T ACs. This fixes the annual tonnage of WCRL that 
can be caught. The T AC is then divided proportionally among rights holders. This 
is the main control method; it places a limit, and helps to stabilize the catch, 
allowing statistics of the stock to be generated. In addition, the annual catch 
tonnage can be adjusted in relation to the stock abundance. 
2. Total Allowable Effort or TAE. This limits the number of people, boats or traps 
that can be used to harvest the WCRL TAC established. Bag limits are also part of 
the T AE, restricting the amount of fish an individual may catch; for example, in 
recreational fishing. 
3. Closed seasons. This is used to control catch effort, especially during breeding 
seasons to allow reproduction. Theoretically, closing fishing periods during 
breeding seasons are favoured to allow individual species to concentrate in one 
area to breed without being harvested. Closed seasons also allow disturbed 











4. Closed areas or 'no-take' MPAs. Closed off fishing grounds help to stabilize 
stocks, control dumping and control the targeting of by-catch with relatively 
lower enforcement costs. This method is also highly favoured to protect the entire 
ecosystem and breeding stocks, while also permitting base-line research to be 
done. 
5. Gear restrictions. Using exclusion or escape devices in fishing gears minimizes 
the fishing of non-targeted species. In addition, it can control the size of 
individuals caught using specified mesh or hook sizes. 
6. Size restrictions. Minimum sizes are set to prevent the harvesting of juveniles or 
spawning individuals. (Branch and Clark, 2006:7). 
WCRL industry sectors 
The domestic WCRL industry IS divided into commercial, limited commercial, 
recreational and subsistence sectors. The commercial sector permits right holders to 
harvest 1000kg or more of WCRL for sale in specified areas and seasons. The 
recreational sector permits a right holder to harvest only four WCRL per day for own 
consumption in specified areas and seasons. The "limited commercial" or "small-scale 
commercial" sector was recommended by the Subsistence Fisheries Task Group (SFTG) 
to include those artisanal fishers who fish for sale. The subsistence sector, though the 
policy has not been enacted, intends to provide access to coastal communities for food 
security and basic needs (OEA T, 2006:29). 
In the Hout Bay area, where the research was conducted, there is no subsistence sector, 
only commercial, limited commercial and recreational sectors. The illegal fishers 
interviewed in this research would fall under this limited commercial sector if they had a 
formal legal permit. With a limited commercial permit, a permit holder is allowed to fish, 
collect, disturb, keep or control, or be in possession of WCRL from I June to 15 











The limited commercial WCRL industry is divided into six zones and fourteen areas in 
which a certain amount of TAC is permitted for allocation of rights. Four of these zones 
which cover eight of the areas are along the western coast of South Africa, as shown in 
Figure 4 below. Fishers in Hangberg and the general Hout Bay area fall under Zone 0 
Area 7 but fishers from other areas can also apply for rights in Zone D. In the current 
2006 allocations, Zone 0 had the highest T AC set at 163.15 tonnes for medium-term and 
150 tonnes for long-term. 31 In total, 187 medium-term rights granted with an average 
allocation of 778kg and 207 long-term rights granted with an average of 724kg allocated 
. h . Z D 3~ per ng t 111 one .-
31 Respondent K, Interview, 21-1 un-06 
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(Source: Respondent K, Interview, 21-Jun-06) 
5.1.2 Formal allocation of property rights under the MLRA 
The Marine Fisheries Policy of 1997 adopts a 'Tragedy of the Commons' perspective; it 
states that an "open or liberative access of the resource, inevitably leads to the 
overexploitation, depletion or even extinction of stocks, wasteful overcapitalisation of the 
industry and consequent loss of income and jobs" (Witbooi, 2006:36) . Hence the policy 
recommended that the MLRA establish a limited entry system, whereby property rights 
are allocated based on a percentage of the T AC. The Marine Fisheries Policy gives a 
definition of an access right: 
"the right to catch or to harvest one or more specified of the South Africa's 
living marine resources through the exercising of some specific effort, subject 
to and conditional upon certain restrictions, constraints or limitations" 
(DEA T, 1997: section 4.6.2.1). 
These rights stipulate the following: 
I. The fishing effort in terms of type and size of vessel; the type of fishing gear or 
fishing method; the size of individual fish species to be caught; areas or zones 
where right may be exercised; and the time period within a year which right may 
be exercised. 
2. The quantity of the species and bycatch in terms of a percentage of the T AC. 
(DEA T, 1997: section 4.6.2.1) 
These rights are sold to fishers and companies through a public tender process, and those 
who get access pay a fee. Applicants can apply for either medium-term or long-term 
rights. Long-term rights are favoured because according to Branch and Clark (2006:9), 












The Formal Legal Order for WCRL 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (national level). 
Minister is responsible for: 
• Enacting legislature and fishing regulations 
• Implementing transformation initiatives 
Directorate: Marine Coastal Management 
(provincial level) 
Collaboration 
• Controls boat launching sites, 
• Conducts research on stocks, 
• Allocates and manages quotas, and 
• Regulating recreational fishing 
Marine Coastal Management: Uout Bay 
Office 
• Enforces fishing regulations in Hout Bay 
and the Karbonkelberg Collaboration 
• Regulates recreational fishing in Hout Bay 
Commercial quota 
holder 
• Quota: I OOOkg or 
over 
• Cannot harvest 
WCRL inside the 
Karbonkelberg 
Limited - Commercial 
quota holder 
• Quota: between 500-
750 kg 
• Cannot harvest WCRL 
inside the 
Karbonkelberg 
South African National Parks-
Western Cape branch 
• Enforces national park and MPA 
regulations in the Western Cape 
Table Mountain National Park 
• Enforce MPA regulations, 
• Patrol MPA 
• Conducts research 
Recreational 
quota holder 
• Quota: four 
WCRL per day 
• Cannot harvest 
WCRL inside the 
Karbonkelberg 











5.2 Evolution of the Informal Fishery 
As the fishing industry expanded in the 1950s-70s, prior to the MLRA, the government 
focused on access rights for the commercial and recreational industry rather than 
subsistence fishing (Hauck and Sowman, 2003:42). As a result, Hauck and Sowman 
(2003:44) describe the management of subsistence and non-commercial fishers as "ad 
hoc, inconsistent and unfair", leaving them with little legal access to marine resources. 
Non-commercial small-scale and subsistence fishers obtained access on an informal basis 
and were classified under regulations designed for recreational fishers (Hauck and 
Sowman, 2003:43). Non-commercial fishers were often unaware of the regulations; those 
who were considered it unfair that they were regulated the same as recreational fishers 
(Hauck et ai, 2002). Consequently, they harvested resources informally and were often 
arrested or fined. Currently, people choose to fish informally even though they know it is 
illegal. In Hangberg, this practice eventually led to an informal system with social norms 
that developed into informal rules amongst the illegal fishers. Three main factors led to 
the evolution of the informal fishery: discontentment of the national law; perception that 
the national law is illegitimate; and people's livelihoods. These three factors are 
discussed below. 
5.2.1 Discontentment with the formal law 
It is estimated that there are 200 fishers in Hangberg alone.33 Of these, only four long-
term limited commercial rights for WCRL were issued to people from Hangberg. This 
leaves the majority of Hangberg fishers dependent on recreational WCRL permits which 
restrict the daily harvest to only four crayfish per day. Informal discussions with fishers 
and other community members highlighted a general discontentment with the rights 
allocation process. This was primarily due to the expense of the allocation process, 
difficulties in understanding the legal procedures, and a sense of unfairness in regard to 
the stipulated criteria for rights applications. 











The MLRA has also increased its fees and verification procedures, in order "to avoid 
allocating rights to those who lacked the capability to exercise their rights and had 
applied with the sole intention of selling their paper quotas" (Branch and Clark, 2006:9). 
Full commercial fishing rights application fees were placed at R6000 instead of R I 00, 
and at R500 for "limited commercial" rights (Branch and Clark, 2006:9). Small-scale 
applicants, with no other means of income apart from fishing, generally consider these 
fees to be too high.34 Even the fishers who had been awarded a permit found the 
application fees too expensive.35 
The 2006 allocation process for WCRL had specific evaluation criteria summarised in 
Table 3 below. According to MCM management, this was the most effective way to 
ensure that actual fishers who had the capacity to fully meet the allocated quota received 
the long-term right (Cockcroft, 2006, pers. comm). 
Table 4. Evaluation Criteria for WCRL long-term permits 
(R d K I . 21 J 06) espon ent , ntervlew, - un-
Exclusionary Criteria Scoring Criteria 
• Personal Involvement in fishing • Involvement as crew on vessels 
• Utilisation of medium term right (MTRH • Investment (NS for MTRH) 
only) • Job creation 
• Access to a suitable vessel • Reliance on the resource 
• Natural South African person • Marketing and processing 
• Residence in the fishing zone • Transformation (HDP & Gender, CS1, 
• Serious non-compliance Skills) 
The allocation process seeks to increase the participation of Historically Disadvantaged 
Individuals or HDIs. This is carried out by redistributing allocation rights to HDIs. In 
addition, HDIs who operate small, medium and micro-enterprises (SMMEs) are 
encouraged to apply for WCRL rights. 36 This is in accordance with national policy aimed 
at readdressing the former apartheid laws and planning and development laws by actively 
facilitating transformation in the fishing industry. 
34 Respondent D, Interview, 20-May-06; Respondent E, Interview, 28-Jun-06. 
35 Respondent A, Interview, 28-Jun-06; Respondent B, Interview, 13-Jul-06. 
36 In terms of the fishing industry SMMEs would constitute an entity with less than 100 employees and 











Despite the progressive transformation which is taking place in the fisheries industry, this 
is not immediately apparent in Hangberg. Although a detailed evaluative criterion is in 
place to ensure equal opportunity for fishers to apply for quota, participants expressed 
frustration that the small-scale fishers from Hangberg were being excluded from these 
rights. 37 In particular, fishers with low education levels found the application forms 
difficult. Some fishers would hire expensive consultants to complete their application 
forms. However, this still could not guarantee a successful application and some of the 
applicants still found that they did not meet the required criteria. Specifically, the small-
scale fishers find it challenging to prove their HOI status. Additionally they fail to meet 
the criteria that requires fishers to both own their own vessels, and have sufficient capital 
for investment. It is often their poverty that creates the need for a quota; however, their 
lack of resources and capital restricts their access to permits, and limits their opportunity 
for a secure livelihood. Furthermore, the respondents claimed that some of the 
consultants conned them for money, or would use the fisher's status as a bona fide fisher 
to secure a quota for a company that awarded them minimal shares. 
The research participants regard themselves as bona fide fishers because they have been 
reliant on fishing for most of their lives, and depend upon it for their economic stability. 
The denial of long-term rights has a disadvantageous impact upon their livelihoods. 
Alternative livelihood options are limited, due to low levels of education, and a narrow 
skills base among small-scale fishers within Hangberg. Geographical accessibility and 
minimal necessary capital investment makes WCRL a lucrative resource for the 
Hangberg fishers. In the absence of access rights or quotas, many fishers choose to fish 
illegally within the MPA. This has led to the establishment of organised illegal fishing 
groups, acknowledged by both MCM staff and TMNP MPA staff. 
37Respondent C, Interview, 2S-Jun-06; Respondent M, Interview, 29-Jun-06; Direct observation, 06-Sept-











5.2.2 Livelihoods of fishers 
The fishers in Hangberg have low education levels and are a historically disadvantaged 
community. As a result, they are a deprived community with little development of the 
area, high unemployment and few livelihood options for fishers. 38 There is a lack of 
waged employment opportunities within Hangberg, and their limited qualifications and 
skills base leaves the fishers without legal financial resources to support their dependents. 
The only skill they have to make a living is fishing. Fishing in Hangberg is a skill, and a 
trade that is essential for their survival and for the provision of their children. Fishing is 
how their families have survived for generations. 
The government's emphasis on access rights & quotas has had a negative impact on the 
subsistence fishers. Although the formal system is necessary because of the 
environmental significance of the MPA, for the Hangberg community it has failed to 
regard the social and physical realities in Hangberg. As a result, people take things into 
their own hands, and disregard the rules which have been established for the protection of 
the environment. In response to the various restrictions placed upon the fishers, they have 
established an informal fishery with social norms, which has evolved over time. 
5.2.3 Legitimacy of the national law 
When a formal legal order is considered legitimate, the people subject to this legal order 
are generally more inclined to comply with its laws. A management system is seen as 
legitimate firstly when justified according to some moral principles and values (Jentoft, 
2000) and secondly depending upon the impression created by the affecting interests' 
decision and judgment (Weber (1978 cited by Jentoft, 2000: 143). These two views on 
legitimacy are apparent in the informal fishery in the Karbonkelberg. Moral principles 
and values are neither universal nor static. The morals and values of the illegal fishers in 
Hangberg have evolved over time and are a result of their culture, beliefs and their 
interaction with each other. The decisions and judgments of the affected individuals are 
subjective and are influenced by experience. The overall impression the illegal fishers 











have of the formal law is that it is unfair and unjust, hence illegitimate in the eyes of the 
illegal fishers. The formal national law is seen as illegitimate for three main reasons: 
I. The subsistence and recreational permit systems are perceived as inadequate. 
There are no subsistence WCRL rights in Hout Bay. There are only recreational 
permits available. These permits allow the fishers to harvest very few crayfish and 
all the areas where fishing is permitted under these permits are far from Hangberg. 
The illegal fishers do not consider it logical that they should spend more money to 
travel long distances to fish few WCRL when they have an area within walking 
distance to their community where they can fish. For the fishers it is not cost 
effective for them to travel long distances to fish for small quantities of fish that they 
'9 may not even sell.~ 
2. The limited-commercial quotas are perceived as nearly impossible to acquire. 
One respondent produced records of quota applications over a ten year period; In 
spite of his numerous applications. and having fished WCRL in the Karbonkelberg 
for over twenty years, he has never been allocated a quota. The majority of the 
poachers, as well as members of the community, expressed frustration and 
disappointment in the allocation process; they feel that it is too expensive and 
complicated for poor uneducated fishers. They also said that there are so many 
criteria that the government said would help them identify who the 'real fishers' are, 
yet after the allocation was announced the fishers remarked that some of the people 
who got allocations were not even fishers. 4o 
3. The fishers and the community feel left out of the management decision making. 
The government depended upon organized user groups during the allocation 
process to make decisions on the allocation of rights, but the poachers feel like their 
decisions are not heard. Furthermore, the participants from the community and the 
39 Respondent D, Interview, 20-May-06. 












poachers do not understand how the government can allocate quotas to 'real fishers' 
if they do not know them. During a discussion with two community members, an 
analogy was given to demonstrate why it should be important for the government to 
know who the 'real fishers'. The respondent commented 'how can some one lend 
to another something like R2000 and not know who that person who they are 
lending to is, where they live and what they do for a living? Yet the authorities 
don't check if people who get quota actually need it' (paraphrased) . .JI The fishers 
report that they have not heard or seen anyone from MCM come into Hangberg to 
check who the fishers in that area are, and who applied for quota . .J2 
The majority of respondents from Hangberg feel that the MCM officials who are 
making management decisions are completely detached from the community who 
are most affected by the laws. Jentoft (2000: 143) warns that this leads to a lack of 
support for the management system at the grass-root level. This is the case in 
Hangberg; the government's management system is perceived as one that ignores 
the small-scale fishers of Hangberg, and is therefore unjust. People feel that "no one 
looks after the fishers" so they look after themselves and fish to survive . .J3 It is an 
accepted way to make a living in the community; people understand that there are 
no livelihood alternatives for the fishers and do not look down on those who 
poach . .J.J 
5.3 The Informal Legal Order: social norms and informal rules in the small-
scale informal fishery 
Information on the informal fishery was obtained primarily through informal interviews, 
direct observation and the two focus groups with the TMNP MPA staff. TMNP MPA 
staff identified the areas where WCRL is targeted by illegal fishers; this is shown in 
41 Respondent 0, Interview, 28-Jun-06; Respondent E, Interview, 28-Jun-06. 
41 Respondent A, Interview, 13-Jun-06; Respondent D, Interview, 27-Jun-06; Respondent 0, Interview, 28-
Jun-06; Respondent N, Interview, 28-Jun-06. 
43 Respondent D, Interview, 27- Jun-06 











Figure 5 below.45 The MPA staff also highlighted three distinct groups of WCRL illegal 
fishers: permit holders poaching for extra income; recreational fishers poaching for extra 
money; or subsistence fishers poaching for food. The informal fishers in the 
Karbonkelberg are the most organised; the fishers are mainly Hangberg residents, who 
poach in organised groups, either for food or for money. 
Within the informal fishery, there are three different types of illegal fishers. The 
difference between illegal fishers depends on how much they harvest, the techniques they 
use, and their underlying incentive to poach. The three types are outlined below. 
I. Large-scale fisher groups: poachers with big boats who are able to go far out from 
the coast. These poachers harvest large quantities of WCRL, primarily for money 
and occasionally for drugs. 
2. Small-scale fisher groups: use low capital investment, and either fish for food, or 
sell for money for other basic needs. Some groups were reported to be involved in 
drugs. They usually fish in groups, and use rowboats and simple ring-net traps. 
3. Small-scale hand-line fishers: individuals who use very minimal equipment, and 
fish small amounts off the rocks along the coast. This is primarily for food, or 
sometimes hand-line fishers will sell the few crayfish they catch for money to buy 
food. 
Late in the research process, another category of illegal fishers were identified. These 
were divers who use wet suits and snorkels to dive between the rocks to harvest WCRL. 
Due to the time constraints of the research process, it was not possible to conduct detailed 
observations of these individuals. Further research to assess the significance of the divers 
in the informal fishery is recommended. 
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This research focuses on small-scale illegal fishers, and does not elaborate more on the 
large scale illegal fishers because of two primary reasons. Firstly, the research process 
had time constraints. At the beginning of the field research, the Hangberg respondents 
were hesitant to introduce the researchers to some large-scale illegal fishers, as we were 
unknown to the community. It was implied that the large-scale illegal fishers were more 
cautious of strangers, and could be dangerous to approach. It would have taken time to 
identify these fishers and be able to learn their system. It was easier to build a rapport 
within the small-scale illegal fishery. Secondly, the NORSA project focuses on non-
compliance in small-scale fisheries. Hence this research is focusing on identifying the 
presence of informal rules in the small-scale informal fishery in the Karbonkelberg. 
There are two different types of illegal small-scale fishers identified in the 
Karbonkelberg: small-scale fisher groups and small-scale hand-line fishers. The 'modus 
operandi' for both these small-scale fishers is discussed below. Informal rules were 
identified within the modus operandi of the small-scale fishing groups and are outlined in 
section 5.3.2. 
5.3.1 Hand-line fishery 
Hand-line fishers go fishing alone or in pairs, but they do not have an organised system, 
nor do they fish in groups. A fisher will catch small quantities of WCRL for consumption 
or to sell for food. Hand-line fishers consider it an art and a "skill" to be able to fish using 
a hand-line.46 They are proud of their skill, and teach each other from when they are 
young. When being taught, the student starts out as a carrier for the bait and catch until 
they can handle the line. 
An experienced hand-line fisher explained the commonly used technique for catching 
WCRL. The WCRL is baited using a simple fishing line, which is wound on a plastic 
rim, and held with bare hands. A fish net is made into a small pouch to hold the bait 
(pilchards or fish heads); this is tied to the end of the fish line and weighted with rocks. 
An example of a hand-line is shown in photo 4. Hand-line fishers do not use nets because 
the underwater currents near the rocks can wash it away. A fisher explained that the 
"communication between you and the crayfish is between your two fingers"; in other 











words, a skilled fisher will be able to identify the kind of fish they have caught by 
recognising the tug at the end of the line.47 Once the fisher feels a tug, they pull up the 
line quickly onto the rocks, take the crayfish by the hand and place it into a bag. 
The weather plays a crucial role when a hand-line fisher is deciding whether or not to go 
out to the rocks. Spring tides are regarded as good fishing seasons, but in terms of the 
daily weather patterns, fishers do not go out when it is too windy because of the danger of 
being blown off the rocks. A good judgement of when the water is calm enough to go 
fishing is when the water is lowest along the rocks at the pier in Hout Bay harbour.48 
Other factors that determine when the fishers go out to fish include the visibility of law 
enforcement officials, and how desperately they require food or money. 
The informal rules for the hand-line fishery are classified according to Ostrom's typology 
of the various informal rules in ePRs referred to in section 2.2.2 (also see Ostrom, 1999). 
1. Boundary rules: Hand-line fishers are all residents of Hangberg. Residents 
from other communities are not allowed to harvest WCRL from the 
Karbonkelberg. Other recreational or subsistence hand-line fishers fish in the 
harbour or in other communities along the coast. 
2. Position rules: An experienced hand-line fisher also acts as a teacher who 
teaches other community members the skill of using the hand-line. The 
student starts out as a carrier until they have mastered the hand-line. 
3. Authori(v rules: Hand-line fishers can fish anywhere along the rocks, and the 
amount they harvest is only limited by the weather and conditions of the sea. 
4. Scope rules: hand-line fishing is for subsistence purposes only. Hand-line 
fishers may also sell crayfish in order to meet their basic needs for food. 
47 Respondent D, Interview, OI-Jul-06 











5.3.2 Small-scale fisher groups 
Hand-line fishers differ from the small-scale fisher groups in that the fisher groups are 
organised and fish in groups, and they use boats so they can harvest larger quantities. The 
informants identified about 10-12 groups in Hangberg involved in WCRL poaching, who 
all know each other. These poacher groups have routine methods and rules with respect 
to fishing, leadership, roles, sales and payment, and relations with other fishers. All the 
groups of poachers organize themselves in a similar way as to what is described; however 
some of the rules may vary slightly. 
i. Groups and leadership roles 
Research showed that the majority of small-scale fisher group members are "rastas" and 
that they are all male.49 Many of the members are young, and are often referred to as 
"lighties".5o Some of the poachers are as young as twelve or thirteen years of age. There 
can be up to fifteen fishers working in a group; groups do not take fishers from other 
groups as each man has his own group. The fishers are not required to fish in the same 
group for the rest of their lives. They are free to move to another group if they choose. A 
fisher cannot work for two different groups at the same time. If one decides to fish in 
another group, then they must leave the original group. Therefore the groups change in 
numbers and size depending on whether someone has moved to another group, or has 
broken off to form a group of their own. 
Some of the illegal fishers did not have a permanent group of people who fished with 
them, but they did own boats. The boat owner can be approached by people in the 
community who need or want to go out to fish, and a request made to borrow the boat. 
The boat owner then sets a payment in terms of a certain percentage of the catch for the 
use of the boat. 
49 Rasta, or the Rastafari movement, "is a reI igion and philosophy that accepts Haile Selassie I, the 
former (and last) emperor of Ethiopia, as Jah (the Rasta name for God incarnate, and part of the Holy 
Trinity as the messiah promised to return in the Bible. The name Rasla/ari comes from Ras (Duke or Chief) 
Ta/ari ,\lakonnen. the pre-coronation name of Haile Selassie J". 
(source: http://en.wikiped ia.orglwiki/Rastafari_ movement) 
50 'Lighties' is colloquial speech members of Hangberg use to refer to young people, particularly those still 











Interviews with MCM and TMNP MPA staff revealed that each member in a group has a 
specific role to play. From the focus group, a diagram was developed that illustrated the 
links between the different players in the informal fishery (Figure 5.3 below). When the 
fishers were interviewed, they were able to elaborate further on what these different roles 
entail. Within a group there is a group leader, and there are skippers, carriers and 
watchmen. These roles were also evident during the direct observations. 
Group leaders 
Each group has a main group leader who controls access to the boat and ring-nets. The 
group leader has the ultimate authority in a group, has the final word on whether people 
will go out to sea on that day or not, and how many times they go out to sea. The group 
leader is also responsible for maintaining the boat, the ring-nets, and the motor (if they 
have one) and acquiring bait. Anyone can become a leader if they own a boat and ring 
nets; this will allow them to control access. If someone saves enough to buy a boat, they 
can call people to fish together. If a fisher wishes to join a group, they must approach the 
leader and ask permission. If the leader declines, they must seek out another group. 
Skippers 
The skipper is considered to be the second senior in the command chain. Skippers will go 
out on the boat, and will often have worked with the group leader for a long time. During 
direct observations, the group leader explained that he does not organize who goes out; 
the skippers organize themselves. A skipper may approach the group leader if he wants to 
go out to sea, and plans which other skipper will go on the boat with him. If the group 
wishes to do more than one trip in a day, they organize a rotation so that when some 
skippers get back to shore, another two or three skippers go out to sea next while the 
others rest. 
Carriers 
Next in the command chain are the carriers; these are responsible for carrying the bait, 











carners explained that he usually works with a particular skipper, although direct 
observation revealed that the carriers change all the time depending on who is available 
and ready to go over the mountain. 
Watchmen 
At the bottom of the chain of command are the watchmen, who are responsible for 
keeping watch over the group from the top of Sentinel Mountain. Some lookouts also 
remain near to the harbour, in order to alert the group if a patrol boat is going out. When 
a person joins a group, they will start off as a lookout or a carrier and are taught until the 
ring leader feels they can go on the boat as a skipper. 
ii. What determines when they fish? 
The illegal fishers fish mostly at night, and although it is dangerous, they are willing to 
take the risk. They may sometimes go out during the day if the sea is calm, depending on 
whether there are patrols and how desperate they are for money. There are four key 
factors that influence whether they go out to fishing or not: 
I. Access to a boat. Poachers who do not want to use a hand-line can only go fishing 
if they have access to a boat. Access to a boat is easy if they are part of a group. If 
they are not part ofa group, then their access to a boat will depend if they can find 
a boat owner without a group and make a request for their boat, as mentioned 
above. 
2. The winds and tide. The rowboats used by small-scale poacher groups are very 
small, and strong winds increase their risk of being blown over. Poachers will 
watch the weather patterns, and only go out when the sea is not rough, which is 
usually when there is no South-East Wind. 51 Poachers also check the extent to 
which the sea foams at the rocks down at the harbour. If the water is very foamy, 
then they know the sea is particularly rough, and they will not go out to sea. 
3. Visibility of law enforcement. MCM and TMNP MPA law enforcement staff 
randomly patrol the Karbonkelberg for illegal activity. Despite of the law 
enforcement patrols, the poachers who participated in this research indicted no 











fear of law enforcement. In fact, it emerged that the TMNP MPA staff are often 
fearful of the poachers; law enforcement staff members have experienced violent 
confrontations with the poachers from Hangberg in the past. As a result, the 
TMNP MPA staff patrol with care. The poachers acknowledge that they see the 
TMNP MPA staff more frequently than MCM, and they rep0l1 that the patrols do 
not last for many hours. If the poachers are caught, law enforcement can 
confiscate their boats and equipment because they are prohibited in the 
Karbonkelberg. If anyone is caught with WCRL, they can either be fined or 
arrested. However, this does not deter the poachers from fishing. One poacher 
admitted that if law enforcement confiscates their boats and equipment, the group 
is negatively affected because they cannot go out to fish. However, he said they 
would find another boat and get other equipment and go back to poaching. One 
poacher admitted that he has been fined and in each occasion he has paid the fine, 
and has gone straight back to poach. The poachers are willing to take the risk of 
being caught and fined because fishing is their livelihood, and they have no other 
way to earn food and money. 
4. How desperate fisher is. The poachers prefer fishing at night, but if they are in 
need of money, they will risk going out in the day. They will even risk going out 
in rough weather if their need is great enough. 
iii. How they fish 
On two occasions during the fieldwork, there was opportunity to make direct observation 
of a poaching group while they were at sea. These observations were also an opportune 
time to interact with other members from the community. 
Preparing the bait and equipment 
Prior to going to sea, the fishers prepare their bait. This consists primarily of pilchards or 
fish heads that the group leader buys from the fish factories at the harbour. Four group 
members were observed cutting up the bait into pieces; these are placed into small hand-
made net bags, which are then placed into a bigger bag (see photo 5). When this is 











When a group goes to sea, everyone fishes together; however, group members are not 
required to participate every time. The group leader does not organize who goes fishing; 
it is left to the fishers to inform him who wishes to fish, and to organize themselves. By 
the time the group is preparing to go to sea, they will know between themselves who is 
going, and the rest of the group will remain in the community. The group leader will 
always go to the rocks when the group goes to fish, although he will not always go in the 
boat. 
They must then hike over the mountain to the rocky shore where they keep their boat. 
Between them, they will carry bait, oars, ring-nets, and the motor (if the boat has one). 
The poachers use narrow, man-made paths, which become very slippery after rain. 
TMNP MPA staff have the authority to confiscate boats which are found along the shore 
in the Karbonkelberg; because no form of fishing is permitted in the no-take zone, boats 
should not be found there, and ought to be kept at the harbour. However, in spite of this 
risk, many of the Hangberg poaching groups will leave their boats on the rocky shore in 
the Karbonkelberg. An example of the boats they use is shown in photo 6. 
Preparing to go to sea 
The poachers go out to sea from an area near Seal Island, behind Sentinel Mountain. 
Photo 7 shows the view of rocks from which the poachers launch, taken from the top of 
Sentinel Mountain. On reaching the launch site, some group members put the baits into 
the ring-nets and tie them to the net (photo 8). The ring-nets are made by the fishers for 
about R 170 each, and are made out of a metal loop and fish net woven into a funnel 
shape at the bottom where the bait is placed. Empty plastic containers are tied to the end 
of a rope attached to the ring-net; these float on the surface of the water, acting as 
markers. Other members of the group bring the boat to the water and prepare to go out to 
sea (Photo 9). If the water is slightly rough they will use the motor, but if the water is 
nice and calm, they just use the oars. Two or three people always go out in a boat for 
safety, reasons while the other members of the groups stay near shore as lookouts. There 
is no set system for deciding where they go; the fishers know the fishing grounds by 











Fishers at sea 
Once the fishers have located a good fishing spot, they will fish until they have finished 
their bait or until the tide comes in. The nets are sometimes left out at sea for a while as 
they move to a different fishing spot, coming back to retrieve the nets on their way back 
to shore. During the direct observations, the group spent between two and three hours 
waiting for the boat that had gone out at sea. The amount of time the fishers stay out at 
sea depends on a range of factors: 
I. How rough the sea is (the rougher it is the faster they come back), 
2. How fast they use up the bait (dependent on how much crayfish there is), 
3. How much crayfish they catch (if they catch a lot in short time, or if they've 
stayed out for many hours without catching anything, they come back); 
4. Patrol boats (if they see MCM or SAN Parks they immediately get back to the 
nearest shore). 
Back from sea 
Each group has people waiting on shore to collect the catch when the boats return to 
shore. When boats are coming back, they help each other to pull them to shore and store 
their boats near the fishing grounds. Each group is responsible for their own boats; they 
do not tow away each other's boats. When the boat comes back to the rocks, the ring 
leader takes all the catch and counts how much was caught. On a good day, a group can 
catch up to two potato sacks worth of fish, or about 3Skg. There are usually two carriers; 
one takes the catch from shore to the top of the mountain, then the other from the top of 
the mountain to the central meeting point. The other members of the group, except those 
who were on the boat, pack the catch and any remaining bait, take the oars, motor (if 
have one) and the ring-nets back to a specific place where the equipment is stored. Each 
group re-convenes at a known meeting place. The group under observation re-convened 











iv. Sales and payment 
The group leader is also middleman between group and buyers. If the catch was not for a 
specific buyer but for themselves, the boat owner will split the catch amongst them. If the 
catch was for a specific buyer, he will keep all of it. The buyers contact the middleman to 
check if there is crayfish, and they arrange time and place to meet when they come back 
from sea. If the buyer fails to collect their 'order' of crayfish, the catch is stored until the 
group leader contacts other potential buyers he knows. Each group has their own frequent 
merchants/buyers who are mostly local residents of the general Hout Bay area, tourists, 
restaurants or people from other towns. People from the community of Hangberg know 
the middlemen and where they sell the catch, so they often pass by the merchant's to 
check if there is any catch for sale. An exchange with people within the community is 
very informal and ad hoc because it is highly dependent on whether the group leader has 
an 'order' from another buyer. 
The market 
It is generally acknowledged that the group leader is the only person in the group who 
locates buyers, although this may not be a steadfast rule. The group leader acts as the 
middleman between the poachers and the market. The middleman establishes a market by 
building a clientele; this is described as a "game of chance".52 The ring leader starts by 
sitting and walking at the harbour with a sample of catch, approaching people who walk 
around to ask them if they want to buy. When someone takes an interest in the lobster for 
sale, they make a deal and the middleman/ring leader takes the catch to buyer. This is 
repeated until the leader builds a working relationship with the buyer. If the ring leader 
builds a large clientele, it implies a big market for crayfish. The ring leader thus plays an 
important economic role because the clientele he builds determines the market and hence 
the demand for the crayfish they poach. The higher the demand, the more crayfish the 
groups will harvest. 











Size and prices 
Certain buyers want specific sizes of crayfish, and some place orders for specific 
quantities. If they catch crayfish that is not the size the buyer has requested, they do not 
throw it out. The small crayfish are either sold to other buyers, or are kept for the 
members of the group or their families. If they catch crayfish with eggs, they may throw 
them back to sea, but sometimes they will scrape the eggs and sell them separately. The 
crayfish is usually sold for R2S-R30 per lobster, or at around R80/kg, but if another buyer 
offers a better price they will take it- they go "for the most money".53 The group leader 
will try to sell immediately, because the price of frozen crayfish is not as high as the price 
for fresh catch. 
Payment 
In terms of finances, the leader is responsible for handling money and dividing it between 
the group members. Once the leader has received the money from the sale, he will deduct 
the expenses for bait and diesel if they own a motor. The money is then divided so that 
the leader and the skippers get an equal share of money, and the balance is split between 
the lookouts and carriers. A good catch is considered to be one that covers the bait (about 
R30), covers the petrol if they use a motor (R60), compensates for the time spent, and has 
some additional money remaining. 
v. Territoriality 
The informal fishing groups from Hangberg do not have territoriality between the groups. 
A territory in this case refers to an area that a group defines as their property that they use 
and defend from other groups of fishers. The fishers repeatedly said "the sea doesn't 
belong to anyone" or "the sea is for everyone" in the sense that they felt that no one can 
restrict others to harvest resources from the Karbonkelberg or restrict them from certain 
areas. 54 During an interview, one fisher explained that the groups do not control and 
defend a particular area in the Karbonkelberg. He said when they want to go fishing and 
they find another group in a boat in a fishing spot, they will either find another spot or 
53 Respondent C, Interview, 28-Jun-06. 
54Respondent D, Interview, 27-Jun-06; Respondent E, Interview, 28-Jun-06; Direct observation, 8-Sept-06; 











come back another time. If they come back the next day, their group is not prohibited to 
fish in the same spot where the other group previously was. A group controls access to 
WCRL in a particular area only if their nets are in the water in that area. Once a group's 
nets are out of the water, that area is free for another group to go fish there. 
Exclusion of non-residents 
The only form of territoriality the poachers admit is towards poachers who are not 
residents of Hangberg. Fishers who are not from Hangberg are restricted from fishing in 
the Karbonkelberg sanctuary by the local poaching groups in Hangberg. One respondent 
stated that it is not acceptable; fishers from other communities have their own "backyard" 
so they "mustn't come to my backyard".55 Hangberg fishers may use covert actions such 
as taking the catch or boats to keep fishers from other communities away. A story was 
told of one incident during which a fisher from another community was thrown into the 
sea; however, details and the outcome remained unclear.56 The resource is not open 
access. As mentioned in section 2.1.1, an open access resource is one that is unregulated 
and gives free and open access to all. In Hangberg, the local small-scale groups regulate 
users of the Karbonkelberg, and restrict access to those who are not from Hangberg. 
There is a kind of ownership even in common property through informal and even illegal 
means (Durrenberger and Palsson 1987:511). In this particular example, the poachers in 
Hangberg take 'ownership' of the Karbonkelberg by intimidating fishers from other 
areas. 
55 Respondent C, interview, 28-Jun-06 
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Figure 7. Modus operandi of the WCRL informal fishery in the Karbonkelberg sanctuary 
(by Navonaeli Omari) 
5.3.3 Summary of informal rules within small-scale poaching groups fishers 
As previously mentioned, the first research question was to determine if there is legal 
plurality in the Karbonkelberg sanctuary and to identify the informal rules in the informal 
fishery. These rules were sometimes stated by informants, but others were observed 
during interviews and participation observation and are summarized in the next section. 
The informal rules were also classified according to Ostrom's typology of the various 
informal rules in CPRs (Ostrom, 1999). 
I. Boundary rules. 
a. Fishing is permitted anywhere from behind Sentinel Mountain towards 
Sandy Bay. 
b. The sea is for everyone. People from Hangberg fish for WCRL in the 
Karbonkelberg sanctuary at anytime, in any spot they want. 
c. If a group's nets are in a particular area, another group cannot fish there 
until the nets are removed. Therefore a group controls access to a 
particular area as long as their nets are there. 
d. People from another town cannot normally fish in the Karbonkelberg 
sanctuary. Only people from the area of Hangberg can fish there. 
e. A resident from another community can only fish in the Karbonkelberg if 
they join one of groups from Hangberg. Joining a group from Hangberg 
removes any conflict. Given that all the poacher groups know each other, 
it is not hard to notice 'outsiders'. 
2. Position rules. Each person in a group has a role each time they go out fishing. 
When someone joins a group, they start out as a carrier and make their way up the 
ladder until they become a skipper. The carrier and lookouts have minimum say 
on the activities. 
3. Authori(v rules. A carrier can not be a skipper unless the ring leader agrees that 












a. The ring leader maintains the boat, controls finances, has final say on 
whether they go out or not. 
b. No territoriality; they fish where they can find fish on a first come first 
served 
c. Two or three fishers in each boat for safety precautions 
d. Nothing is thrown back to sea. If they catch small crayfish they share them 
amongst themselves. I f they catch crayfish with eggs, the ring leader can 
decide whether to throw back into the sea, or sell the eggs separately if 
there is a buyer 
4. Aggregation rules. 
a. Some groups do not allow drugs to be taken within the group. Other 
groups allow drugs; others limit it only to marijuana. 
b. No stealing from other groups: if someone disregards the rule and steals 
crayfish from another group, the stolen catch is located and returned. 
5. Payoff rules. 
a. Ring leader controls finances. 
b. Skipper and ring leader get equal cut of money from any sale while 
carriers and lookouts get half their amount. 
c. Have specific buyers but best price wins catch. Only ring leader can act as 
middleman between group and buyers. 
This section presented the presence of an informal fishery with its informal rules used as 
normative practices that the poachers developed and adhere to voluntarily. This informal 
fishery with its informal rules falls within a formal management system with formal legal 
laws that regulate and manage WCRL. The formal management system represents a legal 
order which is maintained and enforced by the government. The degree to which the 
normative practices in the informal fishery constitute a legal order depends on how 
enduring these rules are, the extent to which they are enforced, and the methods used to 
ensure compliance to these informal rules. The fishers interviewed were reluctant to 











deepen rapport with the fishers to understand the sanctions they employ. In addition, this 
research was carried out over a short time frame limiting the ability to investigate fully 
whether these rules are maintained over time. 
5.4 Significance of the Informal Fishery 
This informal fishery is of significance for three mam reasons. Firstly, the informal 
fishery is an outcome of the fishers feeling marginalised and excluded from management 
decision-making. Secondly, as a result, this informal fishery is seen as legitimate in the 
eyes of the fishers. Thirdly, as a consequence, the informal fishery has created conflict, 
and consequently non-compliance, as a result of the legal plurality in the Karbonkelberg. 
5.4.1 Exclusion from management decisions facilitated cooperation 
"The people are impoverished, there are no alternative livelihoods and they feel 
marginalised", so they follow their own informal system and their informal rules for 
survival. s7 The fishers in Hangberg feel marginalised, left with little employment 
opportunities, and are dependent on the resources provided in the Karbonkelberg for 
survival. The close proximity of the Karbonkelberg and the low technology required to 
harvest WCRL enables the fishers to extract WCRL according to their need. Their 
exclusion from management decision making on the very resource they depend on has 
led them to develop their own informal system to survive. 
The management policies, under the formal law that has nationalised the WCRL fishery, 
are based on the 'Tragedy of the Commons' approach. This approach adopts assumptions 
made in Hardin's model, the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, and the Rational Choice Theory. 
These theories are not necessarily wrong; however, they are also not always applicable 
for every situation regarding the management of a CPR. The informal fishery in the 
Karbonkelberg demonstrates that the assumptions made under these models are not 











always applicable. If one applied the theory of the prisoner's dilemma game and rational 
choice theory, one would not expect cooperation between the poachers in Hangberg. 
i. Prisoner's Dilemma Game and the informal fishery 
In the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) each individual player (small-scale fisher) has 
two alternative actions: to defect or to cooperate. To defect means that each fisher will act 
so as to maximise the benefits regardless of other fishers. However, the defect strategy is 
not the optimal strategy a fisher can choose. According to the PDG, the optimal strategy 
is for fishers to cooperate to yield maximum benefits. The PDG, when applied to a CPR, 
assumes that there is no communication and thus no ability to cooperate. As a result, each 
fisher will opt for the best individual strategy, which is to defect. Therefore, based on 
these assumptions, applying the PDG to the informal fishery in the Karbonkelberg would 
infer that each fisher would choose the defect strategy. 
The fishers in Hangberg demonstrate communication and cooperation. Although there is 
communication, some fishers may still choose not to cooperate and fish alone using a 
hand-line. If a fisher only needs two or three WCRL for food, they are more likely to fish 
alone using a hand-line. If they want to fish larger quantities, they are more likely to join 
a group; this will provide access to the gear and resources required to fish larger 
quantities. Cooperation between the fishers is dependent on the physical and economic 
constraints they face. If a fisher was not economically restrained, they could choose not 
to cooperate with others in group. One could buy a wet suit which would allow him to 
harvest large quantities of WCRL without the need to cooperate with other fishers. 
Therefore, to defect is the optimal strategy to harvest large quantities of WCRL, if they 
are without economic constraints. However, for those who cannot afford to buy efficient 
gears, the optimal strategy to maximise the benefits from the Karbonkelberg is to 
cooperate and form groups in which they reap these benefits. 
ii. Rational Choice Theory and the informal fishery 
According to the rational choice theory, individuals will, out of self-interest, make 











would be to maximise their benefits from the resource. An individual may voluntarily 
engage in collective action to maximise their benefits. However, it is argued that if an 
individual cannot be excluded from receiving the benefits of a collective action, then the 
individual has no incentive to partake in the collective production of that good. 58 
Following this argument, the research would have been expected to show that the fishers 
in Hangberg are not engaged in collective action. The collective action in this case refers 
to cooperation amongst fishers to harvest WCRL. Collective action would not be 
necessary for the fishers because the resource is easily accessible and easily harvested 
without the need to cooperate with other fishers to produce the good. However, the 
fishers in Hangberg demonstrate that cooperation and collective action in harvesting 
WCRL maximises their collective benefits. Their focus is not on harvesting the 
maximum amount of WCRL per individual, rather, maximising the benefits of the group. 
It is important to bear in mind that the maximisation of benefits may not be the only 
factor driving fishers to participate in collective action; traditions and social norms also 
playa part. 
iii. Exclusion facilitated cooperation 
The informal fishery in the Karbonkelberg demonstrates communication and CPR users 
can cooperate in their own interests producing voluntary collective action. When the 
small-scale fishers in Hangberg were left unrecognized and without access rights by the 
government, the situation brought the fishers together to favour interactions of trust and 
reciprocity. As they became more willing to work with each other to overcome their CPR 
dilemma and increase their benefits, common rules and norms were developed. In their 
situation, the dilemma was not resource depletion, but access to the resource. Therefore, 
voluntary collective action and maximising individual interests are not mutually 
exclusive. Rather, an individual may maximise their benefits by cooperating in a 
collective. 











iv. Cooperation reinforced the informal fishery 
The fishers in Hangberg became more organised as they cooperated, and developed 
normative fishing practices. These norms are ingrained in the procedures and behaviours 
of the fishers to a greater extent than the national law. Observations of the informal 
fishery implied that the fishers tend to adhere to these normative practices above the 
formal legal order. However it is not possible from these observations to make a 
conclusive statement as to whether or not these normative practices constitute a legal 
order. 
Legal plurality is described as the presence of more than one legal order.59 There are five 
different legal orders: state law, religious law, customary law, donor law and local law 
(Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan (200 I: II). Local law is the mixture of customary (or folk) 
law, new forms of self-regulation, elements of old and new state law, donor laws and 
social norms that are expressed and used at a local level (Benda-Beckmann and Spiertz 
(1997 cited by Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 200 I: II). Therefore the concept of legal 
plurality in the Karbonkelberg would refer to the juxtaposition of formal national laws 
regarding the harvest of WCRL, and a local law based on the observed normative 
practices. 
5.4.2 Legitimacy of the informal fishery 
The government is not always the only important legitimating institution in CPR 
management.60 This was seen to be the case in the Karbonkelberg. Although the poachers 
are clearly breaking the law by fishing in a no-take zone in the Karbonkelberg MPA 
without legal access rights, the participants from the community and even the managers 
and law enforcement staff all seemed to be understanding towards the poachers. Some 
agreed that the poachers were doing wrong, while others acknowledged that illegal 
fishers have no other means of survival. A number of participants were somewhat 
indifferent about the poachers; they regarded poaching as fishing, and fishing was their 
lifestyle, occupation and livelihood. In a sense, the informal fishery could be regarded as 
being legitimate by the poachers, and to some extent by the Hangberg community. 
59 See section 2.2 











The poachers have certain beliefs and values that they use to justify poaching. The 
informal rules in the informal fishery complement these beliefs and values more than the 
formal law. 
1. Fishers, not poachers. The fishers in Hangberg have been fishing their whole 
lives and have depended on fishing for their livelihoods. They do not agree that 
they should be restricted from fishing if they need food/money when the resource 
is close in proximity and accessible; they feel entitled to use this resource. The 
informal rules do not restrict them from fishing whereas the formal law does. 
Thus by following the informal rules, the poachers can fish anytime they want. 
2. Free for all. The poachers believe and repeatedly affirmed that anyone should 
have access to the sea and its resources. The fishers do not see why the 
government should restrict them from using a resource that they believe is free for 
all. When the poachers are seen by patrols and are asked about their permits they 
remark "God says we don't need a permit to fish.,,61 The sea is right at their 
doorstep and they see it as a resource that is there to use, and the informal fishery 
supports this belief. On the other hand the formal laws are viewed as taking away 
the sea that is God's free gift for everyone, so the informal rules are seen as more 
legitimate to follow. 
3. Fishing is not a crime. The illegal fishers do not regard themselves as poachers. 
They are fishers, and though they do not have legal permits to harvest WCRL, 
fishing is not a crime. The fishers do not equate poaching to crime because they 
believe that fishing is not harmful to anyone. Instead of breaking into houses 
because they do not have money, they would rather 'rob' the sea. 62 The fishers 
claim that fishing, although illegal, is not considered as wrong. It is the formal 
law that perceives the action as a felony. In fact the illegal fishers feel that it is the 
big quota holders with many boats and lots of money who are damaging the 
61 TMNP marine rangers, FocliS group, 06-Jul-06 











resource, even though they do not fish in the Karbonkelberg. Since there are no 
alternatives for the fishers to get money for food, other basic needs, or even some 
luxury items, poaching is seen as the 'better' thing to do. The formal law deems 
these fishers as criminals, while the informal fishery regards them as fishers, 
legitimizing their claim that their actions should not be looked down upon as 
transgressions. 
5.4.3 Conflict and non-compliance 
The presence of the informal rules and the formal law presents contlict. The contlict can 
be described according to Bennett et al. (2001) as a mixture of type I and type II (section 
2.2.4). 
I. Type I contlicts: over who controls the fishery e.g. access issues, exclusion from 
access. The illegal fishers feel that the government does not have a right to restrict 
and exclude them from using a resource that they feel is for everyone and is 
available right next to their community. 
2. Type II contlicts: over how fishery is controlled, e.g. quota allocation issues. The 
illegal fishers feel marginalised because the process of getting a quota is 
expensive and complicated for poor uneducated small-scale fishers. In addition, 
the fishers are dissatisfied with the national law because few residents from 
Hangberg received a quota. Furthermore, some of the successful applicants are 
not regarded as bona fide fishers who need the quota. On the other hand, taking 
into consideration the limited supply of crayfish, MCM claim that they have 
managed to reallocate the TAC, so that more people can participate in the small-
scale industry with a quota that is viable to sustain the fisher's livelihoods. 
The presence of contlict in the Karbonkelberg sanctuary has resulted in non-compliance 
by the small-scale poachers. The poachers follow their informal rules in their organised 
informal fishery and disregard the national laws. However, the underlying root cause as 
to why the national laws are disregarded is because the legal management system is seen 











response that Hirschman (1975 In Jentoft, 2000: 141) describes as a result of 
discontentment with the rules the management system has produced. Therefore non-
compliance is a result of the perceived illegitimacy of the management system; the 












6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Legal plurality in the Karbonkelberg 
Non-compliance is an important issue in the sustainable governance of CPRs. The 
NORSA project aims to develop an analytical framework to understand non-compliance 
in small-scale fisheries. This case study in the Karbonkelberg MPA was chosen due to 
high levels of non-compliance by illegal fishers from the community of Hangberg. These 
illegal fishers appeared to have their own system of informal rules which they use to 
harvest WCRL from the Karbonkelberg. The research reveals that there is an organised 
informal fishery in the Karbonkelberg with informal rules. The hand-line fishers in the 
Karbonkelberg have informal rules regarding: 
I. Access to the resource: rules on who has access to fish in the Karbonkelberg 
and where a hand-line fisher can harvest WCRL. 
2. The scope of fishing activities: hand-line fishers are subsistence fishers 
3. Teaching the trade: experienced hand-line fishers teach others the skill. 
The small-scale fisher groups in the Karbonkelberg have informal rules regarding: 
I. Access to the resource: rules of who has access to Karbonkelberg, and on fishing 
spots. 
2. Group roles: rules on the specific roles of each person in the group and how 
roles change over time. 
3. How they fish: rules on procedure and process in fishing, at sea and when they 
come back to shore. 
4. Drugs and stealing: rules on consuming drugs and theft. 
It was assumed at the beginning of the research process that non-compliance was due to 
the presence of legal plurality. A situation of legal plurality refers to the presence of more 
than one legal order. However, this research shows that presence of informal rules among 











the informal fishery would need to demonstrate that these normative practices endure 
over time, and that these informal rules are enforced among fishers. The observations 
from this research cannot state conclusively that these normative practices constitute a 
legal order and that the high level of non-compliance among fishers from Hangberg is a 
result of legal plurality. However, the presence of this informal fishery is a response to 
how the fishers from Hangberg perceive the national legal order. 
6.2 Legitimacy in environmental management 
The informal fishery evolved because the fishers were discontent with the national law 
that they perceived as illegitimate because it restricted them from their primary livelihood 
as fishers. In addition to these factors, the fishers felt excluded from management 
decisions, which created an opportunity for cooperation. This cooperation led to the 
organisation of the fishers into groups through which they are able to optimise the 
benefits of the resource available to them as a collective group; WCRL in the 
Karbonkelberg. As the groups became more organised, norms on their fishing activities 
were developed. 
Policy governing fisheries, or other CPRs in environmental management, that are based 
on the "Tragedy of the Commons', Prisoners Dilemma and Rational Choice models are 
not always applicable to every CPR situation. These policies need to be tailored to the 
specific situation, in order to be regarded as legitimate by the national government and 
CPR users alike. The formal law can be regarded as illegitimate if the CPR users perceive 
it as being unfair and unjust, impeding or restricting their livelihoods. When CPR users 
find the laws that govern a resource they are dependent on for their livelihoods as 













In order to build upon this research, the following steps are recommended: 
• Long-term research should be undertaken to determine whether the normative practices 
of the fishers in Hangberg constitute a legal order, thus establishing a situation of legal 
plurality. A legal order requires normative practices to be enforced, and to endure over 
time. The gathering of such information requires detailed research over a longer period 
of time, in order to establish sufficient rapport with respondents. 
• Government and management structures should improve their links with individuals 
and groups affected by the policies at a grassroots level. This will give greater insight 
into the reasons underlying non-compliance, and will enable decision-makers to 
identify bona fide fishers and HDls effectively. 
• Government policies which are based on the 'Tragedy of the Commons' approach 
should be reassessed; consideration must be given to environmental, social and 
economic constraints on CPR users. 
• Research should be undertaken to investigate the possibilities of establishing a 
communal property rights regime with the fishers from Hangberg. The creation of such 
a regime could increase access to the resource, reduce the need for illegal fishing, and 
lead to greater compliance within the Karbonkelberg. 
The limited access which the Hangberg fishers face has led to frustration and 
discontentment with the formal system; this in turn has led to illegal fishing, and the 
creation of normative practices. In order to address this situation, there is a need for 
government to understand the social, economic and physical realities for Hangberg and 
other small-scale fishing communities, and to adapt the management policies to the 
situation. There is a broad spectrum of factors which influence an individual's decision to 
comply or not comply. It is important for government authorities to consider all of these 
factors, and to tailor policy to the ecological, social and economic opportunities and 











legitimacy of government policies relating to CPR, and addressing the Issue of non-
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8.2 Reference to field notes 
Interviews 
Number Respondent Date Affiliation Interviewer(s) 




MCM rock lobster head of 
I K 21-Jun-06 
Lobster research 
Maria Hauck, Navo Omari MCM: Cape Town research. Introduced 
through Maria Hauck 
Son has rock lobster 
2 A I3-Jun-06 Fisher Maria Hauck, Navo Omari Hout Bay quota. Introduced through 
an MCM officer 
A 28-Jun-06 Maria Hauck, Navo Omari Hout Bay 
Fisher family; has 
Hangberg 
company but doesn't have 
3 N 28-.J un-06 
community 
Maria Hauck, Navo Omari Hangberg WCRL quota. Introduced 
through community 
member. 
Fisher family. Helps 
4 M 29-.Jun-06 
Hangberg 
Maria Hauck, Navo Omari Hangberg 
fishers apply for quota. 
community Introduced through a 











Number Respondent Date Affiliation Interviewer(s) 
Place Interview was 
Comments 
conducted 
Interview was first initial 
contact to MCM offices in 
Hout Bay. Interview was 
facilitated by Merle 
MCM-Hout Bay 
Merle Sowman, Richard Sowman. Richard Hasler 
5 J 19-May-06 Hasler, Stig Gezelius, Hout Bay (supervisor) and Stig 
(Harbour Master) 
Navo Omari Gezelius (research 
partner) particpated 111 
interview as part of a 
introductory field trip to 
the study area. 
Interview was first initial 
contact to the Hangberg 
Community. Respondent 
was introduced through 
Navo Omari, Richard 
Merle Sowman. Richard 
6 D 20-May-06 Illegal fisher Hout Bay Hasler (supervisor) and 
Hasler, Stig Gezelius 
Stig Gezelius (research 
partner) particpated 111 
interview as part of a 
introductory field trip to 











Number Respondent Date Affiliation Interviewer(s) 




poaching group (Rasta). 
Walked through Hangberg 
Community and was 
introduced to community 
D 27-Jun-06 Maria Hauck, Navo Omari Hangberg members. Also walked up 
towards Sentinel 
Mountain ans was shown 
the area along the coast 
where the illegal fishers 
launch their boats. 
D 01-Jul-06 Maria Hauck, Navo Omari Hangberg Life History of respondent 
Stay at home mother. 
7 Q 03-Jul-06 
Wife of rasta 
Maria Hauck, Navo Omari Hangberg 
Introduced through her 
poacher husband who is an illegal 
fisher. 
Community activist, 
Involved in the Hout Bay 
Hangberg 
civic and Hout Bay 
9 0 28-Jun-06 
community 
Maria Hauck, Navo Omari Hangberg Solution Seekers. Also 
participated in the direct 












Number Respondent Date Affiliation Interviewer(s) 







Involved in the Hout Bay 
II E 28-Jun-06 
fisher 
Maria Hauck, Navo Omari Hangberg Solution Seekers. 
Introduced through a 
community member 
o I-Jul-06 Maria Hauck, Navo Omari Hangberg 
12 G 13-Jun-06 
MCM-Hout Bay 
Maria Hauck, Navo Omari Hout Bay 
(Sr Inspector) 
13 I 28-Jun-06 
MCM-Hout Bay 
Maria Hauck, Navo Omari Hout Bay 
(Sr Inspector) 
Commercial Father of two rock lobster 
14 B 13-Jul-06 Long term quota Maria Hauck, Navo Omari The Heights quota holders. Introduced 
holder through an illegal fisher. 
16 H 13-Jun-06 
MCM-Hout Bay 












Number Respondent Date Affiliation Interviewer(s) 
Place Interview was 
Comments 
conducted 
Illegal fisher and 
middleman. Introduced 
through a community 
member. First contact at 
residence where we 
17 C 28-Jun-06 Illegal fisher Maria Hauck, Navo Omari Hangberg 
observed fishers who had 
just returned from sea. 
The fishers were preparing 
WCRL for sale by 
weighing and sizing the 
crayfish and placing them 
into a bag. 
C 29-Jun-06 Maria Hauck, Navo Omari Hangberg 
Interview was first initial 
contactwith the SANParks 
MPA Unit staff. 
Interview was facilitated 
SAN Parks (MPA Merle Sowman, Richard 
by Merle Sowman. 
Richard Hasler 
18 F 19-May-06 Unit Operations Hasler, Stig Gezelius, Hout Bay 
(supervisor) and Stig 
Manager) Navo Omari 
Gezelius (research 
partner) particpated in 
interview as part of a 
introductory field trip to 











Number Respondent Date Affiliation Interviewer(s) 
Place Interview was Comments 
conducted 
F 20-Jun-06 Maria Hauck, Navo Omari Simonstown 
Principal, Hout 













Place of Place of Number of 
Date meeting observation Hours Number of participants Comments 
Illegal 
Observed fishers as they 












prepared bait, when they 
resident 
Karbonkelberg were out at sea and as 
Mountain they returned to shore 
Illegal 
Rocky shore Observed fishers as they 




walked with them to 
resident 
Mountain their meeting point 
Illegal 
Rocky shore Observed fishers when 
behind they were out to sea. 
OS-Sep-06 fisher's 
Karbonkelberg 
two and half over twenty 














Date Place Participants Comments 
SIX SANParks 
MPA staff: two 
SAN Parks seargents and 
MPA Unit, two corporals. 
Cape of 
Maria Hauck One 
05-1ul-06 (facilitator), administratvice 
Good Hope 
Richard staff and the 
















patrol the MPA 
Omari 
123 
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